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Nondelegating Death
ALEXANDRA L. KLEIN
Most states’ method of execution statutes afford broad discretion to
executive agencies to create execution protocols. Inmates have
challenged this discretion, arguing that these statutes
unconstitutionally delegate legislative power to executive agencies,
violating the state’s nondelegation and separation of powers doctrines.
State courts routinely use the nondelegation doctrine, in contrast to the
doctrine’s historic disfavor in federal courts. Despite its uncertain
status, the nondelegation doctrine is a useful analytical tool to examine
decision-making in capital punishment.
This Article critically evaluates responsibility for administering capital
punishment through the lens of nondelegation. It analyzes state court
decisions upholding broad legislative delegations to agencies and
identifies common themes in this jurisprudence. This Article positions
legislative delegation in parallel with historic and modern execution
practices that utilize responsibility-shifting mechanisms to minimize
participant responsibility in carrying out capital sentences and argues
that legislative delegation serves a similar function of minimizing
accountability in state-authorized killing.
The nondelegation doctrine provides useful perspectives on capital
punishment because the doctrine emphasizes accountability,
transparency, and perceptions of legitimacy, core themes that permeate
historic and modern death penalty practices. Creating execution
protocols carries a high potential for arbitrary action due to limited
procedural constraints, secrecy, and broad statutorily enacted
discretion. The decision to authorize capital punishment is a separate
policy decision than the decision of how that punishment is carried out.
This Article frames a more robust nondelegation analysis for method of
execution statutes and argues that legislators determined to utilize the
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penalty should carry greater accountability for investigating and
selecting methods of execution and should not be allowed to delegate
these decisions.
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“If we feel the need to actually protect the moral misgivings of
the people participating, then there is no greater evidence of
what we are doing is wrong.”1

I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has reshaped the American death penalty by imposing
guiding principles that attempted to narrow legislators’ and jurors’ discretion in
decisions about who should be sentenced to death and how those decisions are

1 Brigid Delaney, Bryan Stevenson: If It’s Not Right to Rape a Rapist, How Can It Be

OK to Kill a Killer?, GUARDIAN (Feb. 16, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015
/feb/17/bryan-stevenson-if-its-not-right-to-a-rapist-how-can-it-be-ok-to-kill-a-killer
[https://perma.cc/J3MZ-5BAQ] (quote from an interview with Bryan Stevenson).
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made.2 Despite these efforts, the death penalty remains vulnerable to criticisms
about arbitrariness, inadequate standards, and excessive discretion.3 Execution
procedures are equally susceptible to these critiques.4
Most states’ method of execution statutes grants broad discretion to
executive agencies to create execution protocols, including selecting the drugs
to be used in lethal injection.5 Death row inmates have unsuccessfully
challenged these statutes as unconstitutional legislative delegations that violate
state constitutions’ separation of power doctrines,6 with one notable exception.
In Hobbs v. Jones,7 the Supreme Court of Arkansas held that the Arkansas
General Assembly had “abdicated its responsibility” by giving the Arkansas
Department of Corrections the “unfettered discretion to determine all protocols

2 See, e.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 334–36 (1976); Woodson v. North

Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 302 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 271–72 (1976); Proffitt
v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 251–53 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).
3 See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2760 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“40 years
of further experience make it increasingly clear that the death penalty is imposed arbitrarily,
i.e., without the ‘reasonable consistency’ legally necessary to reconcile its use with the
Constitution’s commands.”); Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (plurality
opinion) (“[I]f a State wishes to authorize capital punishment it has a constitutional
responsibility to tailor and apply its law in a manner that avoids the arbitrary and capricious
infliction of the death penalty.”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (joint opinion
of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.) (“[W]here discretion is afforded a sentencing body on
a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should be taken or spared,
that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly
arbitrary and capricious action.”); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309–10 (1972) (Stewart,
J., concurring) (“These death sentences are cruel and unusual in the same way that being
struck by lightning is cruel and unusual. For, of all the people convicted of rapes and murders
in 1967 and 1968, many just as reprehensible as these, the petitioners are among a
capriciously selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in fact been
imposed.”) (footnotes omitted); BRANDON L. GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE: HOW KILLING THE
DEATH PENALTY CAN REVIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 227 (2017).
4 See CORINNA BARRETT LAIN, LETHAL INJECTION: WHY WE CAN’T GET IT RIGHT AND
WHAT IT SAYS ABOUT US 1–3 (forthcoming) (manuscript at 1–3) (on file with the Ohio State
Law Journal) [hereinafter LAIN, LETHAL INJECTION].
5 See, e.g., N.C. DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, EXECUTION PROCEDURE MANUAL FOR SINGLE
DRUG PROTOCOL (PENTOBARBITOL) 17 (Oct. 24, 2013), https://files.nc.gov/ncdps/docu
ments/files/Protocol.pdf [https://perma.cc/RW3H-7VCH] [hereinafter NORTH CAROLINA
PROTOCOL]; see also Eric Berger, Lethal Injection Secrecy and Eighth Amendment Due
Process, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1367, 1407 (2014) [hereinafter Berger, Lethal Injection].
6 See, e.g., Zink v. Lombardi, No. 2:12-CV-4209-NKL, 2012 WL 12828155, *8 (W.D.
Mo. Nov. 16, 2012); Cook v. State, 281 P.3d 1053, 1058 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012); Sims v.
Kernan, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d 300, 309 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018); State v. Deputy, 644 A.2d 411,
420–21 (Del. Super. Ct. 1994), aff’d, 648 A.2d. 423 (Del. 1994); Diaz v. State, 945 So. 2d
1136, 1143 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam); Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657, 670 (Fla. 2000) (per
curiam); State v. Osborn, 631 P.2d 187, 201 (Idaho 1981); State v. Ellis, 799 N.W.2d 267,
289 (Neb. 2011); Ex parte Granviel, 561 S.W. 2d 503, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc);
Brown v. Vail, 237 P.3d 263, 270 (Wash. 2010) (en banc).
7 Hobbs v. Jones, 412 S.W.3d 844 (Ark. 2012).
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and procedures, most notably the chemicals to be used, for a state execution.”8
This violated the state’s nondelegation doctrine and rendered Arkansas’s
method of execution statute9 facially unconstitutional.10
Despite Jones’s outlier status,11 the nondelegation doctrine is more relevant
to death penalty administration than it seems at first glance. Justice Brennan’s
dissent in McGautha v. California,12 which contended that the failure to set
standards in capital cases violated the due process clause, relied on, inter alia,
nondelegation cases to support his argument for the need to eliminate
“legislative abdication” that resulted in arbitrary determinations in capital
sentencing.13 Numerous scholars have examined accountability, discretion,
deference, and responsibility in the death penalty for a variety of actors.14 None,
however, have meaningfully considered the application of the nondelegation
doctrine to death penalty administration.
The nondelegation doctrine requires branches of government to comply
with their constitutionally-prescribed spheres of authority by prohibiting the
legislature from delegating pure legislative power to another branch.15 Although
the nondelegation doctrine has not enjoyed robust treatment in federal courts,16
state courts retain and apply it. Recent events at the Supreme Court have also
signaled the possibility of a revival of the federal nondelegation doctrine.17
8 Id. at 854.
9 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-617 (West 2011), amended by 2013 Ark. Laws Acts 139, 89th

Gen. Assemb., Gen. Sess. (Ark. 2013).
10 Jones, 412 S.W.3d at 847; see Lauren E. Murphy, Note, Third Time’s a Charm:
Whether Hobbs v. Jones Inspired a Durable Change to Arkansas’s Method of Execution Act,
66 ARK. L. REV. 813, 814 (2013).
11 See Zink v. Lombardi, No. 2:12-CV-4209-NKL, 2012 WL 12828155, at *7 (W.D.
Mo. Nov. 16, 2012) (discussing Hobbs v. Jones, 412 S.W.3d 844 (Ark. 2012)).
12 McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 252 (1971), reh’g granted, judgment vacated
by Crampton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 941 (1972).
13 Id. at 251–53, 253 n.2 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
14 See, e.g., MATTHEW H. KRAMER, THE ETHICS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: A
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATION OF EVIL AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 16–18 (2011); Eric Berger,
In Search of a Theory of Deference: The Eighth Amendment, Democratic Pedigree, and
Constitutional Decision Making, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 1, 17–18, 44–50, 61 (2010); Eric
Berger, The Executioners’ Dilemmas, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 731, 746, 750–52 (2015); Deborah
W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling Paradox Behind State Uses
of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What It Says About Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63, 68–
69, 100 (2002); Markus Dirk Dubber, The Pain of Punishment, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 545, 546,
587 (1996); Joseph L. Hoffman, Where’s the Buck?–Juror Misperception of Sentencing
Responsibility in Death Penalty Cases, 70 IND. L.J. 1137, 1140 (1995); Michael J. Osofsky,
Albert Bandura, & Philip G. Zimbardo, The Role of Moral Disengagement in the Execution
Process, 29 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 371, 373, 385 (2005).
15 See infra Part II (discussing the nondelegation doctrine).
16 See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2130–31 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring)
(“Nevertheless, since 1935, the Court has uniformly rejected nondelegation arguments and
has upheld provisions that authorized agencies to adopt important rules pursuant to
extraordinarily capricious standards.”).
17 See infra notes 172–73 and accompanying text.
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In Gundy v. United States,18 although a plurality of the Supreme Court
upheld Congress’s broad delegation of authority to the Attorney General to
determine the applicability of registration requirements for certain sex
offenders, three Justices dissented, contending that the nondelegation doctrine
should apply.19 Justice Alito’s concurrence in the judgment indicated his
willingness to reconsider nondelegation.20
The nondelegation doctrine implicates government accountability,
transparency, and perceptions of legitimacy of legislative conduct.21 These
issues carry great significance in capital punishment. Administrative structures
in capital punishment obscure responsibility for, and decision-making in, stateauthorized killing in many ways. Legislatures confer substantial discretion on
executive agencies or prison officials to establish and implement execution
protocols.22 Statutes and execution protocols conceal executioners’ identities.23
Information about execution drugs and processes is often exempted from states’
freedom of information acts,24 and corrections agencies usually do not have to
comply with state administrative procedure acts when creating execution
protocols.25
The decline of capital punishment only increases the urgency of these
concerns. As Brandon Garrett points out, only a handful of prosecutors in a few
counties are responsible for the continued use of the penalty.26 States have
expanded their choices of methods of execution in response to botched
executions and lethal injection drug shortages.27 The decline of the death
penalty, along with the challenges states face in conducting executions,
increases the risk of arbitrariness.28 How decisions about the death penalty are
made, and who makes them, matter just as much as what those decisions are.
18 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).
19 Id. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
20 Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
21 See infra Part V.A.
22 See infra Part II.B.
23 See VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-233 (West 2020); Sandra Davidson & Michael Barajas,

Masking the Executioner and the Source of Execution Drugs, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 45 (2014);
see also infra Part II.B.
24 See ROBIN KONRAD, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., BEHIND THE CURTAIN: SECRECY
AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE UNITED STATES 14–16 (Robert Dunham & Ngozi Ndulue
eds.), https://files.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/pdf/SecrecyReport-2.f1560295685.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9TR3-JZAD] [hereinafter KONRAD, BEHIND THE CURTAIN] (surveying
state secrecy laws).
25 See infra note 273 and accompanying text.
26 GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE, supra note 3, at 190–92 (“Even within the largest death
penalty states, just a handful of counties produce the death sentences that result in
executions.”).
27 See Deborah W. Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos Post-Baze, 102 GEO. L.J. 1331, 1361
(2014); see also Deborah W. Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary: How Medicine Has
Dismantled the Death Penalty, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 49, 63 (2007).
28 See Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2755–56 (2015) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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This Article draws upon nondelegation and capital punishment scholarship
to examine the nondelegation doctrine in state method of execution statutes and
execution protocols. It critically evaluates state court decisions upholding broad
legislative delegation to executive agencies to create execution protocols. It
illustrates the relationship between these practices and historic and modern
execution procedures that delegate responsibility within the executive branch
for carrying out state-authorized killing. Legislative delegation is one of many
methods to minimize responsibility for carrying out capital punishment.
Part II analyzes modern and historic methods of execution. Executions
utilize intra-executive delegation or other methods of spreading responsibility
among participants carrying out executions. How the state chooses to kill, and
the way that burden is spread, illustrates why the nondelegation doctrine offers
a unique perspective on the role of the death penalty in American society.
Part III outlines the nondelegation doctrine, with a primary focus on the way
in which states have formulated their nondelegation doctrines. It also discusses
the potential for a shift in the application of the doctrine in federal courts after
the Supreme Court’s decision in Gundy. The potential for increased scrutiny
could serve to reframe the debate about delegation in method of execution
statutes. Part IV examines litigation in which capital defendants challenged a
state’s method of execution statute on nondelegation grounds and explores the
reasoning courts relied on to authorize broad delegations to agencies to create
execution protocols with limited guidance. This Part illustrates common themes
in nondelegation cases and judicial support of broad legislative delegation.
Part V contends that capital punishment schemes that rely on shifting
responsibility and minimizing accountability undermine government
accountability, transparency, and perceptions of legitimacy of the death penalty.
The justifications for delegation are not met by the reality of capital punishment,
particularly because judicial decision-making relies on unjustified assumptions
of agency expertise. Inadequate procedural controls, secrecy, and minimal
legislative guidance and oversight present a substantial risk of arbitrary action.
It concludes by offering a stronger nondelegation analysis for method of
execution statutes.
Like executioners, legislatures seek to shift the responsibility for stateauthorized killing to other individuals or agencies. Spreading responsibility for
killing absolves entities of the need to grapple with the true consequences of
capital punishment. This Article contends that the decision to authorize capital
punishment is a separate policy decision than the decision of how that
punishment is carried out. In light of the stakes of carrying out capital
punishment and the potential for extraordinary harm, legislators determined to
utilize the penalty should carry greater accountability for investigating and
selecting methods of execution and should not be allowed to delegate these
decisions.
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II. METHODS OF EXECUTION
Deciding how an inmate dies and who kills29 them is a thorny and longstanding issue in capital punishment. A hallmark of the American system of
capital punishment is willingness within the executive branch to pass the duty
of killing, and the details of that action, to another person or institution.30
Legislative delegation to agencies, discussed infra, is properly characterized as
one component of the broader system of responsibility-shifting in capital
punishment.31
Despite the difference between legislative and intra-executive delegation,
recourse to responsibility-shifting mechanisms minimizes responsibility for the
“machinery of death.”32 Parts A and B explore delegation in historic and modern
execution protocols. In historic executions, executive agents responsible for the
act of killing attempted, and often succeeded, in delegating killing to others.33
Modern execution protocols demonstrate similar patterns through mechanical
or structural methods of distancing involvement in killing or spreading
responsibility through the execution team.34 Each of these elements permits
individuals and institutions to disclaim responsibility in killing.

A. Historic Delegation and Responsibility for Killing
Historic accounts of executions include startling and disturbing examples of
delegation on the part of the executive official responsible for conducting
executions. Timothy Kaufman-Osborn describes a practice in medieval England
by which some convicts could receive commutations or pardons if they took a
turn as an executioner.35 This practice continued in colonial America;
condemned prisoners could receive a reprieve in exchange for executing their

29 I use the term “kill” deliberately in this Article. Regardless of one’s opinion about
capital punishment, the death penalty is the state-sanctioned act of killing another human
being. Using sanitized language will not change that fact and seems inappropriate when
discussing responsibility for state-sanctioned killing. See, e.g., Robert M. Cover, Essay,
Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1622 (1986).
30 See infra notes 41–50 and accompanying text.
31 See infra notes 316–18 and accompanying text.
32 Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1145 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari) (“From this day forward, I shall no longer tinker with the machinery of death.”);
Rumbaugh v. McCotter, 473 U.S. 919, 920–21 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
33 See infra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.
34 See infra notes 73–77 and accompanying text.
35 TIMOTHY V. KAUFMAN-OSBORN, FROM NOOSE TO NEEDLE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
AND THE LATE LIBERAL STATE 66 (2002).
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fellow prisoners.36 Sheriffs typically carried out executions,37 although they
“tended to delegate these responsibilities when they could.”38 In addition to
seeking prisoners to carry out executions, sheriffs would attempt to hire
individuals to carry out executions.39 Prisoners’ participation in executions did
not, however, end when hanging did. One of the executioners at the botched
execution of Willie Francis in 1946 was an inmate at the Louisiana State
Penitentiary named Vincent Venezia.40
This “democratized” early American death penalty moved the responsibility
for carrying out executions “from a small set of specialists to a diffuse group of
amateurs, where it would remain as long as executions were conducted by
hanging.”41 The general public distaste for executioners may explain these
delegation practices.42 The sheriff could fulfill his executive duties while
passing off the unpleasant task to someone else.43

36 See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 36 (2002)

(“Maryland found it so difficult to appoint an executioner that the colony turned to a
succession of criminals, each of whom was reprieved from a death sentence in exchange for
agreeing to serve as hangman for a term of years or life.”); id. at 37 (describing specific cases
in which prisoners facing death sentences hanged other prisoners); JOHN D. BESSLER, CRUEL
& UNUSUAL: THE AMERICAN DEATH PENALTY AND THE FOUNDERS’ EIGHTH AMENDMENT
262 (2012) [hereinafter BESSLER, CRUEL & UNUSUAL].
37 See BANNER, supra note 36, at 36; CRAIG BRANDON, THE ELECTRIC CHAIR: AN
UNNATURAL AMERICAN HISTORY 25 (1999); see also KAUFMAN-OSBORN, supra note 35, at
65–66 (discussing the responsibilities of sheriffs in medieval England).
38 BANNER, supra note 36, at 36; see AUSTIN SARAT, KATHERINE BLUMSTEIN, AUBREY
JONES, HEATHER RICHARD, & MADELINE SPRUNG-KEYSER, GRUESOME SPECTACLES:
BOTCHED EXECUTIONS AND AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY 40 (2014) [hereinafter SARAT,
GRUESOME SPECTACLES].
39 BANNER, supra note 36, at 36–37 (“[B]ills submitted by sheriffs for reimbursement
often included entries for payments to several other people for actually carrying out the
hanging.”).
40 See Deborah W. Denno, When Willie Francis Died: The “Disturbing” Story Behind
One of the Eighth Amendment’s Most Enduring Standards of Risk, in DEATH PENALTY
STORIES 17, 41–43 (John H. Blume & Jordan M. Steiker eds., 2009).
41 BANNER, supra note 36, at 38.
42 See BANNER, supra note 36, at 36 (“In England and elsewhere in Europe, death
sentences were carried out by professional executioners, specialists loathed by the public.”);
CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS AND OTHER WRITINGS 70 (Richard
Bellamy ed., Richard Davies trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1995) (1764) (“What are
everyone’s feelings about the death penalty? We can read them in the indignation and
contempt everyone feels for the hangman, who is after all the innocent executor of the public
will . . . .”); BESSLER, CRUEL & UNUSUAL, supra note 36, at 262 (discussing public revulsion
for executioners); Dubber, supra note 14, at 551 (describing public sentiment towards
executioners).
43 See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2144 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(discussing delegation as an abdication of responsibility while still receiving credit for
having addressed a problem).
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The inherent difficulties of hanging triggered other forms of intra-executive
delegation. Hanging is often an ineffective and painful way to kill,44 despite
attempts to use scientific principles to assess the proper length of rope and
drop.45 A short drop chanced “painful death by slow suffocation.”46 In some
public hangings, if a prisoner did not die instantly after the drop, family or
friends might pull on the hanging prisoner’s legs to ensure that death came more
swiftly.47 On the other hand, a longer drop or other miscalculation risked
decapitation.48 As Stuart Banner explains: “In the 1870s, in an effort to make a
painless death more likely, local officials in several places that still used the old
downward method of hanging began trying longer drops.”49 Unfortunately, this
led to near or complete decapitations, horrified observers, and sharp public
criticism.50
When conducting hangings, officials “sought methods of removing their
own agency from the process of hanging.”51 State officials hired professionals
to hang inmates.52 Alternatively, officials created automated gallows systems
44 See Campbell v. Wood, 18 F.3d 662, 717 (9th Cir. 1994) (Reinhardt, J., concurring

and dissenting, Appendix A) (“The evidence presented on remand clearly showed that
hanging creates a significant risk both of decapitation and of slow asphyxiation.”); BANNER,
supra note 36, at 170–73 (discussing the problem of painless hanging and describing botched
hangings); KAUFMAN-OSBORN, supra note 35, at 116–20; SARAT, GRUESOME SPECTACLES,
supra note 38, at 34–35, 39–41 (discussing the complexity of execution by hanging); ELIZA
STEELWATER, THE HANGMAN’S KNOT: LYNCHING, LEGAL EXECUTION, AND AMERICA’S
STRUGGLE WITH THE DEATH PENALTY 63 (2003) (describing the hanging of James McCaffry
in 1851, who remained conscious and struggling for five minutes after the drop); Martin R.
Gardner, Executions and Indignities—An Eighth Amendment Assessment of Methods of
Inflicting Capital Punishment, 39 OHIO ST. L.J. 96, 120 (1978); Anny Sauvageau, Romano
LaHarpe, & Vernon J. Geberth, Agonal Sequences in Eight Filmed Hangings: Analysis of
Respiratory and Movement Responses to Asphyxia by Hanging, 55 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1278,
1278 (2010); see also Matt Soniak, Hanging Themselves Was the Only Way to See How
Hanging Works, MENTALFLOSS (Mar. 31, 2012), http://mentalfloss.com/article/30340/hewanted-better-understand-hanging-so-he-hanged-himself-12-times [https://perma.cc/
DW6A-TVY5] (discussing Nicolas Minovici, who researched hanging by hanging himself
and volunteers in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
45 See Campbell, 18 F.3d at 717 (Reinhardt, J., concurring and dissenting, Appendix A)
(discussing drop tables for hangings); see also KAUFMAN-OSBORN, supra note 35, at 122.
46 Campbell, 18 F.3d at 717 (Reinhardt, J., concurring and dissenting, Appendix A);
BRANDON, supra note 37, at 35–36.
47 See SARAT, GRUESOME SPECTACLES, supra note 38, at 32–33.
48 Campbell, 18 F.3d at 718 (Reinhardt, J., concurring and dissenting, Appendix A)
(“[E]very single expert who testified at the evidentiary hearing acknowledged at one point
or another that some prisoners who are hanged in Washington may be decapitated.”).
49 BANNER, supra note 36, at 173.
50 See id. (describing the executions of Charles Jolly, Henry Hollenscheid, Samuel
Frost, Patrick Hartnett, and James Stone); see also Campbell, 18 F.3d at 720 (Reinhardt, J.,
concurring and dissenting, Appendix A) (discussing the execution of Black Jack Ketchum
in New Mexico).
51 BANNER, supra note 36, at 173–74.
52 Id. at 176.
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that effectively “allowed condemned criminals to hang themselves.”53 When the
prisoner stepped onto the gallows platform, a mechanical reaction would trigger
the hanging either by jerking the prisoner up into the air, or dropping the
prisoner.54 Francis Barker “invented, for his own 1905 execution, an electrical
device that allowed him to release the trap door himself by pressing a button
strapped to his thigh.”55 Automated devices appeared in other execution
methods. In 1912, Andrija Mircovich, sentenced to die in Nevada, selected the
firing squad as his method of execution.56 Confronted with the difficulty of
finding anyone to perform the execution, Nevada “constructed a firing squad
machine, mounting three rifles on a framework that fired the weapons” when
strings were cut or pulled.57 One of the rifles was loaded with a blank.58
The movement towards technologically driven (and purportedly more
humane) methods of killing like the electric chair, the gas chamber, or lethal
injection arose in part from public perceptions of the cruelty of botched
hangings.59 Adopting more “humane”60 methods of killing that interposed
technology or physical distance between the executioner and the condemned
could make the act more impersonal, reducing executioners’ emotional
burdens.61
The gas chamber presented one opportunity to interpose technology or
physical distance because the executioner did not come in contact with the
condemned.62 In California, executioners mixed water and sulfuric acid in the
53 Id. at 174.
54 Id. (describing execution machines in Colorado, Connecticut, and Nebraska).
55 Id.
56 See Christopher Q. Cutler, Nothing Less than the Dignity of Man: Evolving

Standards, Botched Executions and Utah’s Controversial Use of the Firing Squad, 50 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 335, 400 (2002–03); Deborah W. Denno, The Firing Squad as “A Known and
Available Alternative Method of Execution” Post-Glossip, 49 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 749,
790 (2016) [hereinafter, Denno, The Firing Squad].
57 Cutler, supra note 56, at 400; see also Denno, The Firing Squad, supra note 56, at
790.
58 See Denno, The Firing Squad, supra note 56, at 790; see also Patty Cafferata, Capital
Punishment Nevada Style, NEV. LAW., June 2010, at 3, 8.
59 See BANNER, supra note 36, at 176–77 (citing newspaper reports from that era);
BRANDON, supra note 37, at 25–46 (discussing the shift in public sentiment away from
hangings).
60 Cf. BANNER, supra note 36, at 200–01 (describing errors in lethal gas executions);
SARAT, GRUESOME SPECTACLES, supra note 38, at 116 (“Five out of every one hundred
executions by lethal gas had been botched.”).
61 See BANNER, supra note 36, at 204 (“Clinton Duffy, the warden at San Quentin
during many of its gas chamber executions, surveyed the officers under his command and
discovered that all of them preferred the gas chamber to the gallows. The men felt less
‘directly responsible for the death of the condemned,’ he explained.”).
62 See id. at 196–97 (describing gas chamber executions). Michel Foucault makes the
same point about the guillotine: “Death was reduced to a visible, but instantaneous event.
Contact between the law, or those who carry it out, and the body of the criminal, is reduced
to a split second. There is no physical confrontation; the executioner need be no more than a
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“Mixing Room,” and a pipe carried the solution to reservoirs under the chair
where the condemned would be strapped in to die.63 To kill the inmate, a
member of the execution team pushed a lever that lowered a bundle of sodium
cyanide crystals into the acid-water solution, producing hydrocyanic gas.64
Technological developments also led to professional executioners; the
complexity of the electric chair meant that killing was delegated to
professionals, usually electricians.65 As methods of execution evolved,
execution protocols and internal processes continued to adopt methods of
responsibility shifting. The next section explores more recent delegation and
responsibility-shifting mechanisms.

B. Minimizing Accountability for Killing
Modern execution protocols permit, and even encourage, delegation. The
official conducting or supervising executions selects the executioner, who may
not even work for the department of corrections.66 Florida’s executioner is not
a prison employee, but “a private citizen who is paid $150 per execution” and
whose identity is kept secret.67
Execution protocols and state laws conceal execution procedures and
participants’ identities.68 State laws prohibit disclosing the identities of

meticulous watchmaker.” MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE
PRISON 13 (Alan Sheridan trans., Vintage Books 2d ed. 1995) (1975) [hereinafter FOUCAULT,
DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH].
63 Fiero v. Gomez, 865 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (N.D. Cal. 1994), vacated, Fierro v.
Terhune, 147 F.3d 1158 (9th Cir. 1998).
64 Id.
65 See BANNER, supra note 36, at 194–95; BRANDON, supra note 37, at 208–09, 220–
21 (discussing professional executioners).
66 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.10 (West 2020); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-10(2)–
(3) (West 2020) (allowing the executive director of corrections or a “designee” to select
people to carry out lethal injection or “peace officers” to compose the firing squad); see also
supra notes 28–37 and accompanying text (discussing historic internal executive delegation
of killing).
67 Death Row, FLA. DEP’T OF CORR., http://www.dc.state.fl.us/ci/deathrow.html
[https://perma.cc/J5MX-DGJ2].
68 See KONRAD, BEHIND THE CURTAIN, supra note 24, at 14–16; Berger, Lethal
Injection, supra note 5, at 1388–92; Deborah W. Denno, America’s Experiment with
Execution Methods, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS
ON THE PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 707, 721–24
(James R. Acker, Robert M. Bohm, & Charles S. Lanier eds., 3d ed. 2014).
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execution team members69 or suppliers,70 and may exempt execution
procedures from state freedom of information laws.71 Execution protocols track
statutory secrecy and establish procedures to hide the execution team’s
identities.72 Concealing executioners’ and suppliers’ identities shields them
from possible negative consequences in their communities.73 It also serves
symbolic functions. It is not the individual executioner who kills, but the
embodiment of the state.74
Other procedures shield executioners from knowing whether they were
responsible for killing. A repealed New Jersey statute required the lethal
69 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-757(C) (2020); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-233

(West 2020);TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 43.14(b) (West 2019); see also KONRAD,
BEHIND THE CURTAIN, supra note 24, at 14–16; ROBERT JAY LIFTON & GREG MITCHELL,
WHO OWNS DEATH?: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE, AND THE END OF
EXECUTIONS 88 (2000) (describing the secrecy surrounding executioners’ identities).
70 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 42-5-36(d)(2) (2020); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,
§ 1015(B) (West 2020); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-234 (West 2020); see also KONRAD, BEHIND
THE CURTAIN, supra note 24, at 14–16.
71 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-617 (West 2020); see also KONRAD, BEHIND THE
CURTAIN, supra note 24, at 14–16; LAIN, LETHAL INJECTION, supra note 4 (manuscript at
42–45).
72 See, e.g., FLA. DEP’T OF CORR., EXECUTION BY ELECTROCUTION PROCEDURES 8–9
(Feb. 27, 2019), http://www.dc.state.fl.us/ci/docs/Electrocution%20Certification%20Ltr%
20and%20Procedure%202-27-19%20Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/DHD5-45BN] (describing
a separate, secured “executioner’s room”); NORTH CAROLINA PROTOCOL, supra note 5, at
16–17; OHIO DEP’T OF REHAB. & CORR., EXECUTION 18 (Oct. 7, 2016), https://files.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/legacy/files/pdf/ExecutionProtocols/OhioProtocol10.07.2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RCX5-R69F] [hereinafter OHIO PROTOCOL]; VA. DEP’T OF CORR.,
EXECUTION MANUAL 10 (Feb. 7, 2017), https://files.deathpenaltyinfo.org/legacy/files
/pdf/ExecutionProtocols/VirginiaProtocol02.07.2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/5G6J-4TU3]
[hereinafter VIRGINIA PROTOCOL]; see also Berger, Lethal Injection Secrecy, supra note 5,
at 1388–91.
73 See Motion for Leave to File and Brief for the States of Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae
in Support of Applicants at 13, Barr v. Roane, No. 19A615 (Dec. 3, 2019) (“Without the
assurance of confidentiality, ‘there is a significant risk that persons and entities necessary to
the execution would become unwilling to participate.’”) (quoting Owens v. Hill, 758 S.E.2d
794, 805 (Ga. 2014)); supra note 42 (discussing the historic unpopularity of executioners).
There is a difference between legislative accountability and identifying members of an
execution team. Nonetheless, the secrecy surrounding execution teams’ identities is one
component of a multilayered and opaque system of extreme delegation and shifting
responsibility. It should also be noted that there does not appear to have been any serious
threats to execution teams or supplying pharmacies. See LAIN, LETHAL INJECTION, supra note
4 (manuscript at 45–49) (discussing the absence of threats).
74 See FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE & PUNISH, supra note 62, at 10 (“Those who carry out the
penalty tend to become an autonomous sector; justice is relieved of responsibility for it by a
bureaucratic concealment of the penalty itself.”); KAUFMAN-OSBORNE, supra note 35, at 200
(describing executions as “another means of validating the state’s monopoly over the means
of legitimate violence”); Osofsky et al., supra note 14, at 385 (discussing execution
participants’ tendency to rely on “the societal imperative to use the death penalty as the
ultimate punishment for homicidal crimes”).
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injection protocol to ensure that the identity of the person who actually carried
out the sentence would be concealed even from the executioner themselves.75
Utah’s current statute requires “two or more persons . . . [to] administer a
continuous intravenous injection,” but only one of those injections contains the
lethal substances.76 These procedures may be intended to ameliorate
executioners’ stress or trauma potentially caused by participation in an
execution.77
The lethal injection machine Fred Leuchter78 developed exemplified this
principle.79 In The Execution Protocol, Stephen Trombley explains, “The basic
design requirement . . . is that it should kill quickly and efficiently, and in a way
that causes the least pain and distress to the condemned person, the executioners,
and the witnesses.”80 The machine used two modules, one to deliver the drugs
75 N.J. STAT. Ann. § 2C:49-3 (West 2006), repealed by L. 2007, C. 204, § 7 (effective

Dec. 18, 2007) (“[T]he procedures and equipment utilized in imposing the lethal substances
shall be designed to insure that the identity of the person actually inflicting the lethal
substance is unknown even to the person himself.”). The New Jersey Legislature abolished
the death penalty in 2007. See New Jersey, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR., https://deathpenalty
info.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state/new-jersey [https://perma.cc/U3ZF-XLX2].
76 UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-10 (West 2020).
77 See, e.g., JOHN D. BESSLER, KISS OF DEATH: AMERICA’S LOVE AFFAIR WITH THE
DEATH PENALTY 115–16 (2003) [hereinafter BESSLER, KISS OF DEATH]; LIFTON &
MITCHELL, supra note 69, at 89–90 (describing the impact on members of execution teams);
Allen L. Ault, The Hidden Victims of the Death Penalty: Correctional Staff, WASH. POST
(July 31, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/07/31/hidden-victimsdeath-penalty-correctional-staff/ [https://perma.cc/74YW-G48V]; Jim Dwyer, Jim Dwyer of
Newsday, Long Island, NY, NEWSDAY (Nov. 21, 1994), https://www.pulitzer.org/winners
/jim-dwyer [https://perma.cc/P5YY-93CH] (click “Living with Those Deaths”); Jerry
Givens, I Was Virginia’s Executioner from 1982 to 1999. Any Questions for Me?, GUARDIAN
(Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/nov/21/death-penaltyformer-executioner-jerry-givens [https://perma.cc/NZS6-WPE5]; Robert T. Muller, Prison
Executioners Face Job-Related Trauma, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Oct. 11, 2018),
https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/talking-about-trauma/201810/prison-execut
ioners-face-job-related-trauma [https://perma.cc/57K4-QT6Z].
78 Fred Leuchter, once nicknamed “Dr. Death,” has been described as a “selfproclaimed execution expert and manufacturer of death machinery,” despite lacking the
qualifications to practice engineering. See An ‘Expert’ on Executions Is Charged With Fraud,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 24, 1990), https://www.nytimes.com/1990/10/24/us/an-expert-onexecutions-is-charged-with-fraud.html [https://perma.cc/6H9E-TSRQ]; see also STEPHEN
TROMBLEY, THE EXECUTION PROTOCOL: INSIDE AMERICA’S CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
INDUSTRY 84–86 (1992). Jurisdictions have since stopped using the machine. See Malcolm
Gay, Uncomfortably Numb, RIVERFRONT TIMES (Dec. 15, 2004), https://www.riverfront
times.com/stlouis/uncomfortably-numb/Content?oid=2482648 (on file with the Ohio
State Law Journal).
79 See KAUFMAN-OSBORN, supra note 35, at 181 (“The net result is a system that
eliminates virtually all possibility of error while simultaneously perfecting the mechanisms
that enable the dispersion and denial of responsibility for dealing death.”); see also BANNER,
supra note 36, at 299; Dubber, supra note 14, at 563–66.
80 TROMBLEY, supra note 78, at 78–79.

936

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 81:5

and one to control the execution.81 The control module was in a different room
than where the execution takes place, and required two members of the
execution team to operate it.82 The module had “two complete sets of
controls.”83 “When it was time for the execution to commence, each of the
executioners presses a button. A computer in the machine chooses which
executioner has activated the sequence, and the choice is then automatically
erased from the computer’s memory.”84
This method has both historic roots and modern applications. West
Virginia’s electric chair was operated by pressing three buttons, but two were
“dummies,” and “no one could be certain which button sent the current to the
chair.”85 Japan currently uses comparable methods to conduct hangings; prison
employees press buttons simultaneously, but “none is told which button is the
‘live one’ that will cause the prisoner’s fall.”86
Firing squad procedures also inject some doubt into who kills. Utah’s firingsquad protocol requires a “five-person execution team,” with two alternates and
a team leader.87 Four .30-caliber rifles are loaded with two rounds each, and the
fifth with blanks.88 “Care shall be taken to preclude any knowledge by the
members of the firing squad of who is issued the weapon with two blank
cartridges.”89 This is a consistent practice in firing squads.90 It allows
participants to reasonably claim they do not know if they killed the prisoner,

81 Id. at 79; Dubber, supra note 14, at 565–66.
82 TROMBLEY, supra note 78, at 79.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 BRANDON, supra note 37, at 235.
86 Miwa Suzuki, Cruel Yet Popular Punishment: Japan’s Death Penalty, YAHOO NEWS

(Sept. 7, 2018), https://sg.news.yahoo.com/cruel-yet-popular-punishment-japans-deathpenalty-044522392.html [https://perma.cc/7QVH-8C5C].
87 UTAH DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, TECHNICAL MANUAL 54, https://cdn.
muckrock.com/foia_files/2017/03/22/3-13-17_MR34278_RES.pdf (on file with the Ohio
State Law Journal) (revised June 10, 2010) [hereinafter UTAH PROTOCOL]; see also Denno,
The Firing Squad, supra note 56, at 782–84 (describing Utah’s firing squad execution
protocols).
88 UTAH PROTOCOL, supra note 87, at 88.
89 Id. at 88–89.
90 The 1959 Procedure for Military Executions requires eight members of a firing
squad, and the officer in charge of carrying out the execution is responsible for ensuring that
“[A]t least one, but no more than three will be loaded with blank ammunition.” DEP’T OF THE
ARMY, PROCEDURE FOR MILITARY EXECUTIONS, AR 633–15, at 4 (Apr. 7, 1959) (rescinded).
The officer is required to place the rifles at random in a rack so that the firing squad will not
know which one they have selected. See id. Mississippi and Oklahoma permit the use of
firing squads in executions. See Methods of Execution, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/methods-of-execution [https://perma.cc/KB3MFZAM]; see also BANNER, supra note 36, at 203 (discussing historic firing squad protocols
in Utah and Nevada that offered executioners the opportunity to disclaim responsibility for
killing); supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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although the odds are not in their favor.91 Corrections officials conceal the firing
squad’s identities by placing the squad in a separate room from the prisoner they
are about to kill.92
Apart from mechanical interventions, execution protocols are “broken down
into several small tasks, each assigned to a different person, to minimize the
sense of responsibility felt by each participant.”93 Lethal injection protocols
illustrate these processes.94 One individual orders the drugs.95 Another
designated individual or team prepares the syringes.96 “Tie-down teams” or
other correctional staff escort the condemned to the death chamber and strap
him to the gurney.97 Montana’s protocols describe in detail which member of
the tie-down team is responsible for each strap—different officers handle
different straps, thus the condemned is tied down by a cohesive group, rather
than an individual corrections officer.98 Another individual or team places the
IVs.99 North Carolina’s execution team prepares the condemned in a
“Preparation Room” by restraining him on the gurney, attaching “cardiac
91 See LIFTON & MITCHELL, supra note 69, at 89 (“This is ‘for the conscience of the

executioners, so no one knows for sure who fired the live round,’ a spokesman for the
corrections department in Utah has explained.”).
92 See UTAH PROTOCOL, supra note 87, at 89; see also NORMAN MAILER, THE
EXECUTIONER’S SONG 1011 (1979).
93 BANNER, supra note 36, at 299; see Osofsky et al., supra note 14, at 386; see also
LIFTON & MITCHELL, supra note 69, at 82 (“Individual responsibility also dissolves, as each
member of the team is given only a limited task.”).
94 See FLA. DEP’T OF CORR., EXECUTION BY LETHAL INJECTION PROCEDURES 2–3 (Feb.
2019), http://www.dc.state.fl.us/ci/docs/Lethal%20Injection%20Certification%20Ltr%20an
d%20Procedure%202-27-19%20Final%20.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q5X8-G6GW] [hereinafter
FLORIDA LETHAL INJECTION PROTOCOL] (describing the different tasks the “team warden”
assigns to various team members, including: “achieving and monitoring peripheral venous
access,” “achieving and monitoring central venous access,” “examining the inmate prior to
execution,” and “attaching the leads to the heart monitors and observing the monitors”); see
also LIFTON & MITCHELL, supra note 69, at 81–82, 103–04 (discussing the “task-oriented”
nature of executions).
95 See FLORIDA LETHAL INJECTION PROTOCOL, supra note 94, at 3; OHIO PROTOCOL,
supra note 72, at 6.
96 See FLORIDA LETHAL INJECTION PROTOCOL, supra note 94, at 9; MONT. DEP’T OF
CORR., MONTANA STATE PRISON EXECUTION TECHNICAL MANUAL 24, 50–51 (Jan. 16, 2013)
(on file with the Ohio State Law Journal) [hereinafter MONTANA PROTOCOL]; OHIO
PROTOCOL, supra note 72, at 12–13; UTAH PROTOCOL, supra note 87, at 77 (“The IV team
leader shall prepare each chemical in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions and
draw them into the two (2) sets of syringes.”).
97 See MONTANA PROTOCOL, supra note 96, at 26; NORTH CAROLINA PROTOCOL, supra
note 5, at 15; OHIO PROTOCOL, supra note 72, at 15.
98 MONTANA PROTOCOL, supra note 96, at 49.
99 See MONTANA PROTOCOL, supra note 96, at 50–51; NORTH CAROLINA PROTOCOL,
supra note 5, at 9 (EMT-Paramedic is “responsible for the insertion of the catheters, IV lines,
and applying of the leads of the EKG”); OHIO PROTOCOL, supra note 72, at 15 (“The Medical
Team shall establish one or two viable IV sites[.]”); UTAH PROTOCOL, supra note 87, at 52,
79–80 (IV Team).
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monitoring electrodes,” inserting the IV, starting the saline solution, and
covering the condemned with a sheet.100 Different team members bring the
condemned into the “Death Chamber,” while other team members finalize the
rest of the preparations.101
The executioner administers the intravenous injections at the warden’s
signal,102 often in a separate room than the death chamber.103 Another member
of the execution team performs consciousness checks after an anesthetic is
administered.104 If the condemned is unconscious, then the warden will signal
the executioner who then administers the second and third drugs.105 Different
members of the team may be responsible for monitoring different equipment or
the prisoner’s bodily functions.106 Ohio has a “Command Center” keeping a
record of the timeline of the prisoner’s death, and a “Drug Administrator”107
announces “the start and finish times of each injection to the Command Center
contact who shall then inform the Command Center for capture on the Execution
Timeline.”108
Compartmentalizing these actions into a series of mechanical, ritualized,
and rehearsed steps separates obvious violence from killing.109 As Markus
Dubber explains, because even participants in a system of capital punishment
“share the general inhibition against inflicting extreme violence on a particular
person, they develop mechanisms to minimize their sense of responsibility for
the infliction of the death penalty.”110 If participants are guaranteed anonymity
and take small, discreet actions, they can more readily disavow any sense of

100 NORTH CAROLINA PROTOCOL, supra note 5, at 15.
101 See id.
102 See MONTANA PROTOCOL, supra note 96, at 52; OHIO PROTOCOL, supra note 72, at

16–18.
103 See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 45 (2008) (“The execution team administers the drugs

remotely from the control room through five feet of IV tubing.”); VIRGINIA PROTOCOL, supra
note 72, at 10.
104 See MISSISSIPPI DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT PROCEDURES 9 (Nov.
2017), https://files.deathpenaltyinfo.org/legacy/files/pdf/MississippiProtocol_11.15.20
17.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5FT-9GP4] [hereinafter MISSISSIPPI PROCEDURES]; MONTANA
PROTOCOL, supra note 96, at 52; VIRGINIA PROTOCOL, supra note 72, at 10.
105 See MONTANA PROTOCOL, supra note 96, at 52. This is in a state that uses a threedrug protocol. See id. at 50–51. Some jurisdictions use single-drug execution protocols. See
State by State Lethal Injection Protocols, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions/lethal-injec
tion/state-by-state-lethal-injectionprotocols [https://perma.cc/ULV9-9YBA] (illustrating six states that have recently used
single-drug executions protocol).
106 See NORTH CAROLINA PROTOCOL, supra note 5, at 17–18; OHIO PROTOCOL, supra
note 72, at 18.
107 Ohio’s protocols refer to the executioner as a “Drug Administrator.” See OHIO
PROTOCOL, supra note 72, at 16–17.
108 Id. at 16, 18.
109 See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text.
110 Dubber, supra note 14, at 562.
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personal responsibility for killing another human being.111 External and
retrospective sources of authority help maintain this façade: the state established
the penalty, the jury sentenced him to death, the courts heard his appeals, and
the warden gave the order.112
Redirecting decisions about killing shifts accountability between
individuals and entities. These practices echo legislative delegation to executive
agencies. Nondelegation fits into this framework because it recognizes the
inherent harms in shifting responsibility for consequential decisions. The next
Part of this article discusses the role of the nondelegation doctrine in state and
federal courts before turning in Part IV to a detailed discussion of inmates’
challenges to method of execution statutes.

III. THE NONDELEGATION DOCTRINE
The separation of powers is a core value in American governance. In
Federalist No. 47, James Madison asserted that, to prevent tyranny, legislative,
executive, and judicial powers must be divided, rather than accumulated by a
branch, individual, or group.113 The nondelegation doctrine derives in part from
this principle.114 Under the doctrine, a legislature may not delegate its “essential
legislative functions” to other governmental bodies, such as administrative
agencies.115 This Part begins with an examination of state nondelegation
doctrines, followed by a discussion of Gundy v. United States,116 and the
significance of the potential for a renewed federal nondelegation doctrine.

A. State Nondelegation Doctrines
The last time the Supreme Court found a legislative delegation
impermissible under the nondelegation doctrine was in 1935.117 Since that time,
111 See supra note 82 and accompanying text; see also Osofsky et al., supra note 14, at
386 (“After lethal activities become routinized into separate sub-functions, participants shift
their attention from the morality of their activity to the operational details and efficiency of
their specific job.”).
112 See BRANDON, supra note 37, at 209; LIFTON & MITCHELL, supra note 69, at 79, 105;
Dubber, supra note 14, at 573.
113 James Madison, The Federalist No. 47, in ALEXANDER HAMILTON, JAMES MADISON,
& JOHN JAY, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS 245, 245 (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2009);
see also Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 756 (1996).
114 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989); KRISTIN E. HICKMAN &
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 2.6, at 1–2 (6th ed. supp. 2020).
115 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935); see also
Loving, 517 U.S. at 757; Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692–94 (1892); Rebecca L. Brown,
Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513, 1553–54 (1991).
116 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116 (2019).
117 See id. at 2129; see also A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 541–42 (“In
view of the scope of that broad declaration and of the nature of the few restrictions that are
imposed, the discretion of the President in approving or prescribing codes, and thus enacting
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the Supreme Court has consistently permitted Congress to make substantial
delegations of powers to agencies and executive officials provided that
Congress supplied an “intelligible principle” to guide the legislature’s
discretion.118 For that reason, many scholars concluded that the nondelegation
doctrine was mostly, if not completely dead.119 Others have suggested that
courts could resurrect the nondelegation doctrine, even if in a slightly different
form than it took in 1935.120 Still other scholarship points to interpretive canons

laws for the government of trade and industry throughout the country, is virtually
unfettered.”); Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 430 (1935) (“Congress has declared
no policy, has established no standard, has laid down no rule.”); HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra
note 114, at 5–6; William D. Araiza, Toward a Non-Delegation Doctrine That (Even)
Progressives Could Like, in SUPREME COURT REVIEW 2018–2019, at 211, 216–17 (Steven
D. Schwinn ed., 3d ed. 2019).
118 See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2129 (listing cases in which the Supreme Court permitted
“very broad delegations”); see also ARCHIBALD COX, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION
153 (1987); HICKMAN & PIERCE, supra note 114, at 139, 143–46; DAVID SCHOENBROD,
POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH
DELEGATION 40 (1993). A few lower courts have found unconstitutional delegations. See
Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. U.S. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1037–38 (D.C. Cir. 1999); South
Dakota v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 69 F.3d 878, 885 (8th Cir. 1995), vacated, 519
U.S. 919 (1996); see also Jim Rossi, Institutional Design and the Lingering Legacy of
Antifederalist Separation of Powers Ideals in the States, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1171 (1999)
(asserting that the federal system “might be said to endorse a strong prodelegation separation
of powers jurisprudence—one that generally favors delegation to administrative agencies,
while precluding congressional delegation with strings attached”).
119 See, e.g., Matthew D. Adler, Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759, 839 (1997); Andrew Coan &
Nicholas Bullard, Judicial Capacity and Executive Power, 102 VA. L. REV. 765, 780 (2016);
Richard D. Cudahy, The Nondelegation Doctrine: Rumors of Its Resurrection Prove
Unfounded, 16 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 1 (2002); Elena Kagan, Presidential
Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2364 (2001); Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of
the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1241 (1994); Eric A. Posner & Adrian
Vermeule, Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1723 (2002);
Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case for Expanding
the Role of Administrative Agencies, 91 VA. L. REV. 93, 145 (2005); Alexander Volokh, The
New Private-Regulation Skepticism: Due Process, Non-Delegation, and Antitrust
Challenges, 37 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 931, 974 (2014).
120 See, e.g., SCHOENBROD, supra note 118, at 14; Larry Alexander & Saikrishna
Prakash, Reports of the Nondelegation Doctrine’s Death Are Greatly Exaggerated, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1297, 1328–29 (2003); Araiza, supra note 117, at 217; Peter H. Aranson, Ernest
Gelhorn, & Glen O. Robinson, A Theory of Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 63 (1982);
Ronald A. Cass, Delegation Reconsidered: A Delegation Doctrine for the Modern
Administrative State, 40 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 147, 198 (2017); Cary Coglianese,
Dimensions of Delegation, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1889 (2019); Jason Iuliano & Keith E.
Whittington, The Nondelegation Doctrine: Alive and Well, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 619,
645 (2017); Bernard Schwartz, Of Administrators and Philosopher-Kings: The Republic,
The Laws, and Delegations of Power, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 443, 459–60 (1977).
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or reliance on other legal doctrines to apply nondelegation principles in federal
cases.121
Unlike the uncertainty in the viability of the federal nondelegation doctrine,
as Jim Rossi has explained, in state courts, “the nondelegation doctrine is alive
and well . . . .”122 Conceptually, state nondelegation doctrines are fairly similar
to the federal nondelegation doctrine in that they stem from constitutional
separation of powers principles. State systems of government parallel the
tripartite federal system.123 Some state constitutions, like the U.S. Constitution,
provide that each branch of government is vested with specific powers.124
Others also have an express separation of powers clause and vesting clauses.125
A handful of state constitutions, while preserving the division of powers,
expressly permit delegation of “regulatory” authority in certain
121 HAROLD H. BRUFF, BALANCE OF FORCES: SEPARATION OF POWERS LAW IN THE

ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 137–38 (2006) (asserting that courts have relied on the
nondelegation doctrine “to justify narrowly construing a statute”); Aditya Bamzai,
Comment, Delegation and Interpretive Discretion: Gundy, Kisor, and the Formation and
Future of Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 164, 174 (2019) (discussing Gundy v.
United States); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Essay, Schecter Poultry at the Millennium: A
Delegation Doctrine for the Administrative State, 109 YALE L.J. 1399, 1409 (2000); John F.
Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 699 (1997);
John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV.
223, 228; Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 316 (2000);
Cass R. Sunstein, Foreward, The American Nondelegation Doctrine, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1181, 1197, 1203 (2018).
122 Rossi, supra note 118, at 1189. But see Keith E. Whittington & Jason Iuliano, The
Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 417 (2017) (observing that
state courts are “surpris[ingly]” willing to defer to legislative delegation).
123 See, e.g., Brown v. Heymann, 297 A.2d 572, 577 (N.J. 1972) (“There is no indication
that our State Constitution was intended, with respect to the delegation of legislative power,
to depart from the basic concept of distribution of the powers of government embodied in
the Federal Constitution.”).
124 See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. 2, § 1, art. 3, § 1, art. 4, § 1; DEL. CONST. art. 2, § 1,
art. 3, § 1; art. 4, § 1; HAW. CONST. art. 3, § 1, art. 5, § 1, art. 6, § 1; KAN. CONST. art. 1, § 3,
art. 2, § 1, art. 3, § 1; N.C. CONST. art. II, § 1, art. III, § 1, art. IV, § 4; N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art.
2, pts. 41–45, see pt. 2 art. 69; N.Y. CONST. art. 3, § 1, art. 4, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. II, § 1,
art. III, § 5, art. IV, § 1; PA. CONST. ch. 2, § 2, ch. 2, § 3, ch. 2, § 4; S.D. CONST. art. 3, § 1,
art. 4, § 1, art. 5, § 1; WASH. CONST. art. II, § 1, art. III, § 2, art. IV, § 1; WIS. CONST. art. IV,
§ 1, art. V, § 1, art. VII, § 2.
125 See ALA. CONST. art. III, § 42; ARIZ. CONST. art. III; ARK. CONST. art. 4, §§ 1–2; CAL.
CONST. art. III, § 3; COLO. CONST. art. III; FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3; GA. CONST. art. 1, § 2,
¶ 3; IDAHO CONST. art. II, § 1; ILL. CONST. art. 2, § 1; IND. CONST. art. 3, § 1; IOWA CONST.
art 3, § 1; KY. CONST. §§ 27–28; LA. CONST. art. 2, §§ 1–2; MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. XXX;
MD. CONST. art. 8; ME. CONST. art. 3, §§ 1–2; MICH. CONST. art. 3, § 2; MINN. CONST. art. 3,
§ 1; MISS. CONST. art. 1, §§ 1–2; MO. CONST. art. 2, § 1; MONT. CONST. art. IV, § 1; N.D.
CONST. art. XI, § 26; NEB. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; NEV. CONST. art. 3, § 1, cl. 1; N.J. CONST.
art. 3, § 1; N.M. CONST. art. 3, § 1; OKLA. CONST. art. 4, § 1; OR. CONST. art. III, § 1; R.I.
CONST. art. V; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 26; S.D. CONST. art. II; TENN. CONST. art. 2, §§ 1–2; TEX.
CONST. art. II, § 1; UTAH CONST. art. 5, § 1; VA. CONST. art. 3, § 1; VT. CONST. ch. II, §§ 2–
5; W. VA. CONST. art. 5, § 1; WYO. CONST. art. 2, § 1.
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circumstances.126 There is, as Keith Whittington and Jason Iuliano have
observed, significant textual support in state constitutions delineating the
responsibilities of each branch and limiting legislative delegation.127
Despite permitting substantial delegation, state courts do apply the
doctrine.128 This may be because state governmental structure, needs, and
policies are sufficiently distinct from the sprawling federal system that a more
robust nondelegation inquiry is viable.129 Likewise, state systems may be “better
equipped” to tackle excessive delegation.130 Internal mechanisms within states
may provide for comprehensive judicial review, increased legislative oversight,
or administrative review processes.131 Similarly, state constitutions are more
amenable to change than the federal constitution, potentially altering separation
of powers analyses.132
State nondelegation cases emphasize the importance of adhering to
separation of powers principles in decision-making.133 The federal
nondelegation doctrine permits Congress to direct others to “fill up the details”
in a statute provided Congress has “la[id] down by legislative act an intelligible
principle to which the person or body authorized to fix such rates is directed to
conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative
power.”134 State nondelegation doctrines rely on similar analyses. In evaluating
126 See CONN. CONST. art. 2, amended by Art. XVIII; NEV. CONST. art. 3, § 1, cl. 2; VA.

CONST. art. 3, § 1; see also OR. CONST. art. III, § 2 (providing the legislature can establish
an agency for budgetary control).
127 Whittington & Iuliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 122, at
416.
128 See 1 FRANK E. COOPER, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 17 (1965) (discussing state
courts’ willingness to strike down statutes with excessively broad delegations); ROBERT F.
WILLIAMS, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 571–72 (2d ed. 1993); Rossi, supra note 118, at
1193; Whittington & Iuliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 122, at
417; see also Brown v. Heymann, 297 A.2d 572, 577 (N.J. 1972) (“[I]n our State the
judiciary has accepted delegations of legislative power which probably exceed federal
experience.”).
129 See ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 238–39
(2009) (“Each of the states has its own, virtually unique, arrangements concerning the
distribution of powers among and within the branches.”); Rossi, supra note 118, at 1170
(“State courts sometimes reach different results than their federal counterparts in deciding
issues of constitutional law because states are distinct institutions of governance, in terms of
their sizes, decisionmaking structures, populations, and histories.”).
130 See COOPER, supra note 128, at 17–18 (discussing the difference between federal and
state courts in checking administrative agencies).
131 See id. at 19.
132 See WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at
239–40; see also Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, American Constitutional Exceptionalism
Revisited, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1641, 1670–71 (2014).
133 See Dep’t of Bus. Regulation v. Nat’l Manufactured Hous. Fed’n, Inc. 370 So. 2d
1132, 1135 (Fla. 1979); Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So.2d 913, 924 (Fla. 1978).
134 J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (quoting
Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville, R.R. Co. v. Comm’rs of Clinton Cty., 1 Ohio St. 77,
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whether delegation is consonant with state separation of powers principles, state
courts, while acknowledging pragmatic governance concerns, draw the line at
allowing agencies to create policy.135 “Flexibility by an administrative agency
to administer a legislatively articulated policy is essential to meet the
complexities of our modern society, but flexibility in administration of a
legislative program is essentially different from reposing in an administrative
body the power to establish fundamental policy.”136
Separation of powers jurisprudence may be classified as either “formalist”
or “functionalist.”137 A formalist approach relies on “bright-line rules designed
to keep each branch within its sphere of power.”138 A functionalist approach
centers on “whether an action of one branch interferes with one of the core
functions of another.”139 States, as in the federal system, use both formalist and
functionalist approaches in separation of powers questions.140 Rossi offers a
helpful taxonomy of the various states’ separation of powers constitutional
provisions and state approaches to nondelegation: “weak,” “strong,” and
“moderate.”141
“Strong” jurisdictions evaluating nondelegation cases analyze the
legislature’s freedom to set policy and delegate against whether the agency’s
actions are consistent with the underlying statutory policies and commands.142
88 (Ohio 1852)); see also Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019) (citing J.W.
Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
135 See Clean Air Constituency v. Cal. State Air Res. Bd., 523 P.2d 617, 626 (Cal. 1974)
(“An unconstitutional delegation of power occurs when the Legislature confers upon an
administrative agency the unrestricted authority to make fundamental policy
determinations.”); CEEED v. Cal. Coastal Zone Conservation Comm’n, 118 Cal. Rptr. 315,
329 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1974) (“Consequently, where the Legislature makes the fundamental
policy decision and delegates to some other body the task of implementing that policy under
adequate safeguards, there is no violation of the doctrine.”); Askew v. Cross Key Waterways,
372 So. 2d 913, 920 (Fla. 1978) (exploring the difference between setting policy and
“fleshing out” an existing policy through regulation); Chapel v. Commonwealth, 89 S.E.2d
337, 342 (Va. 1955) (concluding that legislative failure to declare “specific policy” or “fix
any standard to direct and guide” an agency in making rules was an “invalid” delegation of
legislative power); Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579, 584 (Va. 1930) (“Government could
not be efficiently carried on if something could not be left to the judgment and discretion of
administrative officers to accomplish in detail what is authorized or required by law in
general terms.”).
136 Askew, 372 So. 2d at 924.
137 See Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L.
REV. 989, 997 (2006) [hereinafter Barkow, Separation of Powers]; Brown, supra note 115,
at 1522–23.
138 Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 137, at 997.
139 Brown, supra note 115, at 1527.
140 See WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 129, at
238.
141 See Rossi, supra note 118, at 1190–1201.
142 See Clean Air Constituency v. Cal. State Air Res. Bd., 523 P.2d 617, 628 (Cal. 1974)
(concluding that there was no separation of powers problem because the agency could
exercise its discretion on “reasons relating to the three primary goals” of the legislation); see
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Virginia, for example, has defined “[c]onstitutionally sufficient policies” in
delegation cases as “those ‘where the terms or phrases employed have a well
understood meaning, and prescribe sufficient standards to guide the
administrator.’”143 A key component of this analysis is the guidelines limiting
agency discretion.144 Provided legislatures have set policies and sufficient
guidelines by which agencies exercise their discretion, the legislatures can
delegate to agencies the “‘power to ascertain the facts and conditions to which
the policy and principles apply.’”145
State courts prefer substantial guidelines from legislatures to facilitate
judicial review of nondelegation challenges because courts are more readily able
to assess whether the agency has complied with the will of the legislature.146
“Weak” jurisdictions generally uphold broad delegations as long as
adequate procedural safeguards are in place, and concentrate their analysis on
administrative standards.147 Courts may conclude that judicial review or
compliance with the state’s Administrative Procedure Act (APA) are sufficient

also Rossi, supra note 118, at 1224 (“[S]tate courts adhering to a strong nondelegation
doctrine trade off the potential efficiencies associated with delegation to guard against
faction and ensure that the legislature, rather than agencies, makes key policy decisions.”).
143 Elizabeth River Crossings OpCo, LLC v. Meeks, 749 S.E.2d 176, 192 (Va. 2013)
(quoting Bell v. Dorey Elec. Co., 448 S.E.2d 622, 624 (Va. 1994)).
144 See Clean Air Constituency, 523 P.2d at 626–27 (“To avoid such delegation, the
Legislature must provide an adequate yardstick for the guidance of the administrative body
empowered to execute the law.”); Cottrell v. City & Cty. of Denver, 636 P.2d 703, 709–10
(Colo. 1981) (en banc); State v. Ellis, 799 N.W.2d 267, 289 (Neb. 2011) (“[W]here the
Legislature has provided reasonable limitations and standards for carrying out the delegated
duties, there is no unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority.”); Brown v. Vail, 237
P.3d 263, 269 (Wash. 2010) (en banc) (“The second requirement for proper legislative
delegation is that adequate procedural safeguards be present for the promulgation of rules
and to test their constitutionality once promulgated.”).
145 Thompson v. Smith, 154 S.E. 579, 584 (Va. 1930) (quoting Mutual Film Corp. v.
Ohio Indus. Comm’n, 236 U.S. 239, 245 (1915)); see also Hous. Auth. of City of Dallas v.
Higginbotham, 143 S.W.2d 79, 87 (Tex. 1940) (“The legislature may validly delegate the
authority to find facts from the basis of which there is determined the applicability of the
law; that is, an administrative body may be given the authority to ascertain conditions upon
which an existing law may operate . . . .”); Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Smit, 689 S.E.2d 679,
687 (Va. 2010) (explaining that legislatures need not set out minutiae, but can delegate
authority to create procedures for general standards).
146 See Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913, 918–19 (Fla. 1978) (“When
legislation is so lacking in guidelines that neither the agency nor the courts can determine
whether the agency is carrying out the intent of the legislature in its conduct, then, in fact,
the agency becomes the lawgiver rather than the administrator of the law.”); see also Bullock
v. Calvert, 480 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tex. 1972) (comparing claimed authority of the Texas
Secretary of State over state elections with what the Texas General Assembly had actually
authorized).
147 Rossi, supra note 118, at 1191–92.
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to check administrative discretion.148 For instance, in Brown v. Vail,149
discussed in greater detail infra, the Washington Supreme Court identified
compliance with Washington’s APA with an agency appeals process or judicial
review as a necessary limitation on administrative discretion when assessing
agency rules that may subject a person to “criminal sanctions.”150
The final category in Rossi’s taxonomy, “moderate,” describes jurisdictions
that “vary the degree of standards necessary depending on the subject matter of
the statute or the scope of the statutory directive.”151 This approach appears to
be more consistent with that taken by courts in evaluating nondelegation
challenges to capital punishment statutes. As discussed infra, courts rely
substantially on the presumption of agency expertise and the impracticality of
requiring legislatures to develop detailed protocols.152

B. Recent Developments in the Federal Nondelegation Doctrine
Although the federal nondelegation doctrine is of limited utility in
evaluating state constitutional law,153 recent developments merit some
discussion. The Supreme Court’s current approach to legislative delegation
tracks a functionalist approach, allowing Congress significant freedom in
delegation, provided it has set out an intelligible principle.154 Administrative
agencies exercise substantial discretion in implementing and enforcing laws.155
While the Supreme Court has eschewed the nondelegation doctrine since
1935, the nondelegation doctrine may be “slightly alive.”156 In Gundy v. United
148 See COOPER, supra note 128, at 17 (“[S]tate courts have inclined to the view that
combination of legislative, prosecutory, and adjudicatory functions in a single agency will
be countenanced where a practical necessity therefor exists, but only so long as workable
checks and balances . . . exist to guard against abuses of administrative discretion.”). But see
Rossi, supra note 118, at 1227 (observing that state judicial review of agency rulemaking is
generally weaker than federal APA review).
149 Brown v. Vail, 237 P.3d 263 (Wash. 2010) (en banc).
150 Id. at 269–70.
151 Rossi, supra note 118, at 1198.
152 See infra Part IV.B.
153 See Whittington & Iuliano, supra note 122, at 417.
154 See Brown, supra note 115, at 1553–54.
155 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2123 (2019); Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 372 (1989); see also Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 693–94 (1892).

The true distinction . . . is between the delegation of power to make the law, which
necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The
first cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.

Cincinnati, Wilmington & Zanesville, R.R. Co. v. Comm’rs of Clinton Cty., 1 Ohio St. 77,
88–89 (Ohio 1852).
156 See THE PRINCESS BRIDE (Act III Communications 1987) (Miracle Max: “Well, it
just so happens that your friend here is only mostly dead. There’s a big difference between
mostly dead and all dead. . . . mostly dead is slightly alive”).
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States, the Court held that the federal Sex Offender Registration and
Notification Act (SORNA) did not violate the nondelegation doctrine by
granting the Attorney General discretion to apply SORNA’s sex offender
registration requirements to individuals convicted of sex offenses before
SORNA was enacted.157 Nonetheless, two separate opinions for four members
of the Court signaled a potential shift in the Court’s approach to
nondelegation.158 Justice Alito concurred only in the judgment, and expressed
his willingness to reevaluate the nondelegation doctrine.159 Justice Gorsuch,
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, dissented on the ground
that SORNA effectively permitted the Attorney General to write the law that
would apply to individuals convicted before SORNA was enacted.160
Justice Gorsuch asserted that the “intelligible principle misadventure”161
had obscured “guiding principles” the Court had previously set forth to channel
courts’ analyses of separation of powers cases.162 First, Congress may direct
another branch of government to “fill up the details” provided that “Congress
makes the policy decisions . . . .”163 This required Congress to identify
“standards ‘sufficiently definite and precise’” to permit Congress, the people,
and the judicial branch to determine whether the branch authorized to “fill up
the details” had complied with Congress’s directives.164 Second, Congress is
permitted to make application of a rule contingent on specific fact-finding by
the executive.165 Third, in examining whether a statute impermissibly delegates
legislative power, a court must consider whether there is an overlap between
Congress’s exclusive legislative authority and a power the Constitution has
vested in another branch of government.166
Justice Gorsuch reframed the intelligible principle inquiry against these
principles:
157 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2129–30.
158 See Bamzai, supra note 121, at 166.
159 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment) (“If a majority of

this Court were willing to reconsider the approach we have taken for the past 84 years, I
would support that effort.”).
160 Id. at 2131 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
161 Id. at 2141.
162 Id. at 2136–39.
163 Id. at 2136 (citing Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 31, 43 (1825)).
164 Id.; see also Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426 (1944); In re Kollock, 165
U.S. 526, 532 (1897); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 31 (1825).
165 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (citing Cargo of Brig Aurora v.
United States, 11 U.S. 382, 388 (1813), and Miller v. Mayor of New York, 109 U.S. 385,
393 (1883)). The absence of controlled (or indeed any) fact-finding was one of the factors
that proved fatal to the relevant provision of the NIRA in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293
U.S. 388, 415 (1935) (“It does not require any finding by the President as a condition of his
action.”).
166 See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2137 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); Loving v. United States, 517
U.S. 748, 772 (1996) (discussing an overlap between a delegation of authority to set
aggravating factors in a capital trial for the military and the President’s role as Commander
in Chief); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).

2020]

NONDELEGATING DEATH

947

Does the statute assign to the executive only the responsibility to make factual
findings? Does it set forth the facts that the executive must consider and the
criteria against which to measure them? And most importantly, did Congress,
and not the Executive Branch, make the policy judgments? Only then can we
fairly say that a statute contains the kind of intelligible principle the
Constitution demands.167

He characterized the separation of powers doctrine as a “procedural
guarantee that requires Congress to assemble a social consensus before choosing
our nation’s course on policy questions . . . .”168 Respecting these limitations
protects individual rights,169 and promotes legislative accountability.170
In evaluating the distinctions between Justice Kagan’s majority opinion and
Justice Gorsuch’s dissent, Aditya Bamzai asserts that this analysis measures the
same factors in the Court’s traditional “intelligible principle” analysis; thus the
“real difference” is the level of scrutiny the Court might apply to that analysis.171
Although there is similarity between the analyses, the potential for increased
scrutiny is a significant development in reevaluating the doctrine.172
Justice Kavanaugh did not participate in Gundy, and the Court recently
denied Gundy’s petition for rehearing.173 Even so, the Court can likely count
five members who are willing to reconsider the scope of legislative delegation.
In a statement regarding denial of certiorari in a case that raised the same issues
as Gundy, Justice Kavanaugh signaled his willingness to reevaluate the scope of
the nondelegation doctrine, particularly Congress’s authority to delegate “major
policy questions” to agencies.174 A significant alteration of the federal
nondelegation doctrine, therefore, may be in the cards.175

167 Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141.
168 Id. at 2145.
169 See id. at 2131.
170 See id. at 2134.
171 Bamzai, supra note 121, at 185; see also Coglianese, supra note 120, at 1883

(asserting that Justice Gorsuch’s dissent does not offer more meaningful guidance than the
intelligible principle test).
172 See, e.g., Araiza, supra note 117, at 231–34; Coglianese, supra note 120, at 1883;
Aaron Gordon, Nondelegation, 12 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIBERTY 718, 817 (2019); Sophia Z. Lee,
Our Administered Constitution: Administrative Constitutionalism From the Founding to the
Present, 167 U. PA. L. REV. 1699, 1747 (2019); Jeffrey A. Pojanowski, Neoclassical
Administrative Law, 133 HARV. L. REV. 852, 912 (2020); F. Andrew Hessick & Carissa
Byrne Hessick, Nondelegation and Criminal Law, 107 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020)
(manuscript at 6) (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal).
173 Gundy v. United States, 140 S.Ct. 579 (mem.) (2019).
174 Paul v. United States, 718 Fed.App’x. 360 (6th Cir. 2017) (Statement of Kavanaugh,
J., respecting the denial of certiorari), cert denied, 140 S. Ct. 342 (Nov. 25, 2019) (No. 17–
8330).
175 See, e.g., Gary Lawson, “I’m Leavin’ It (All) Up To You”: Gundy and the (Sort-Of)
Resurrection of the Subdelegation Doctrine, 2018 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 31, 33 (2018–19);
supra note 161.
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This development is significant insofar as it informs the application of state
nondelegation doctrines and provides a possible way to reframe the debate over
delegation in capital punishment.176 Regardless of the strength or weakness of
a state’s approach to delegation, state courts generally reject inmates’ claims
that states’ highly generalized method of execution statutes violate the
nondelegation doctrine.

IV. NONDELEGATION CHALLENGES TO METHOD OF
EXECUTION STATUTES
All twenty-eight states that retain the death penalty use lethal injection as
their primary method of execution.177 Although some states only use lethal
injection,178 others offer prisoners a choice between two or even three
176 In Wisconsin Legislature v. Palm, 942 N.W.2d 900, 935-37 (Wis. 2020), Justice
Kelly’s concurrence expressly discussed Justice Gorsuch’s Gundy dissent in state separation
of powers questions along with Wisconsin precedent. Id. (Kelly, J., concurring). Gundy
could potentially support states’ decisions to apply a more skeptical evaluation of state
legislative delegation.
177 See ALA. CODE § 15-18-82.1(a) (2020); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-757(A) (2020);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-617(a), (c) (2020); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3604(a) (West 2020); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 922.105(1) (West 2020); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-38(a) (West 2020); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 19-2716 (West 2020); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-6-1(a) (West 2020); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 22-4001(a) (West 2020); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431.220(1)(a) (West 2020);
LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:569(B) (2019); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-51(1) (West 2020); MO.
ANN. STAT. § 546.720(1) (West 2020); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-19-103(3) (West 2019); NEB.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 83-964 (West 2020); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 176.355(1) (West 2020);
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15-188 (West 2020); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2949.22(A) (West
2020); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1014(A) (West 2020); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137.473(1)
(West 2020); 61 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4304(a)(1) (West 2010); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 23A-27A-32 (2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-23-114(a) (West 2020); TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 43.14(a) (West 2019); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-5.5(1)(a) (West
2020); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-234 (West 2020); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-904(a) (West
2020). Pennsylvania, California, and Oregon all have governor-imposed moratoriums. See
Mark Berman, Pennsylvania’s Governor Suspends the Death Penalty, WASH. POST (Feb. 13,
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/02/13/pennsylvaniasuspends-the-death-penalty/ [https://perma.cc/BYW5-3MXN]; J. Cooper, Oregon’s New
Governor Plans to Continue Death Penalty Moratorium, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Feb.
23, 2015), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/oregons-new-governor-plans-to-continuedeath-penalty-moratorium [https://perma.cc/T22A-KTH3]; Innocence Staff, California
Governor Imposes Death Penalty Moratorium, INNOCENCE PROJECT (Mar. 13, 2019),
https://www.innocenceproject.org/ca-gov-imposes-death-penalty-moratorium/ [https://
perma.cc/4L3Z-9MQX].
178 See GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-38(a); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2716; IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-38-6-1(a); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4001(a); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-19-103(3); NEB.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 83-964; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 176.355(1); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15188; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2949.22(A); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137.473(1); PA. STAT.
AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4304(a)(1); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-32; TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 43.14(a).
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methods.179 Inmates in Alabama can choose between lethal injection,
electrocution, or nitrogen hypoxia.180 In Virginia and Florida, inmates may
select electrocution or lethal injection; lethal injection is the default if a prisoner
refuses to choose.181 California grants inmates a choice of lethal injection or
gas.182 Some jurisdictions, like Tennessee and Arizona, only give inmates
whose offenses were committed before a certain date a choice between two
methods.183 Some states have authorized alternative methods of execution in the
event that lethal injection is unavailable due to drug shortages or court
rulings.184 Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Utah have authorized the firing squad as

179 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-18-82.1(a); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-757(B); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 3604(b); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.105(1); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-3-530 (2020);
VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-234. Three states, Washington, New Hampshire, and Delaware all
authorize hanging, but none of those jurisdictions retain the death penalty. See Rauf v. State,
145 A.3d 430, 433–34 (Del. 2016) (concluding that Delaware’s death penalty was
unconstitutional because it permitted a judge to determine the facts necessary to impose a
death sentence and did not require juror unanimity); State v. Gregory, 427 P.3d 621, 621–22
(Wash. 2018) (holding that Washington’s death penalty was unconstitutional under
Washington’s Constitution because it was administered in an arbitrary and racially biased
manner); Kate Taylor & Richard A. Oppel Jr., New Hampshire, with a Death Row of 1, Ends
Capital Punishment, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 11, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/11
/us/death-penalty-new-hampshire.html [https://perma.cc/SYY2-ATDH].
180 ALA. CODE § 15-18-82.1(a)–(b).
181 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.105(1); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-234.
182 CAL. PENAL CODE § 3604(a).
183 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-757(B) (2020) (“A defendant who is sentenced to
death for an offense committed before November 23, 1992 shall choose either lethal injection
or lethal gas at least twenty days before the execution date.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 431.220(1)(a) (West 2020) (giving prisoners who were sentenced to death before March
31, 1998 a choice between lethal injection or electrocution); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-23114(b) (West 2020) (“Any person who commits an offense prior to January 1, 1999, for
which the person is sentenced to the punishment of death may elect to be executed by
electrocution by signing a written waiver waiving the right to be executed by lethal
injection.”). If an inmate refuses to choose, statutes identify a “default” method, which is
usually lethal injection. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-757; TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-23114; VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-234.
184 See ALA. CODE § 15-18-82.1(c); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.105(3); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 99-19-51(1) (West 2020); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1014(C) (West 2020); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 24-3-530; TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-23-114(d). States have complained about
difficulties in sourcing lethal injection drugs due to anti-death penalty activists and
pharmaceutical companies’ unwillingness to allow their products to be used in executions.
See, e.g., Ty Alper, The United States Execution Drug Shortage: A Consequence of Our
Values, 21 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 27, 29–31, 33–35 (2014); Lincoln Caplan, The End of the
Open Market for Lethal-Injection Drugs, NEW YORKER (May 21, 2016), https://www.new
yorker.com/news/news-desk/the-end-of-the-open-market-for-lethal-injection-drugs
[https://perma.cc/5R86-VZYK]; Jolie McCullough, How Many Doses of Lethal Injection
Drugs Does Texas Have?, TEX. TRIB., https://apps.texastribune.org/execution-drugs/
[https://perma.cc/NA2T-9FE9] (last updated July 3, 2020).
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a method of execution.185 Some statutes have a “catch-all” clause permitting
Departments of Corrections to choose any constitutional method if all the
legislatively-authorized methods are found unconstitutional or are otherwise
unavailable.186
Most of these statutes do not contain substantial detail beyond the method
of execution the legislature selected. Lethal injection statutes rely on general
reference to “lethal injection,”187 or “the administration of a lethal quantity of a
drug or drugs”188 “by an intravenous injection of a substance or substances in a
lethal quantity sufficient to cause death.”189 Legislatures usually leave it to the
state’s department of corrections to develop protocols and make critical
decisions.190 A handful of jurisdictions have designated classes of drugs, or
specific drugs, to be used in lethal injections, such as anesthetics, barbiturates,
chemical paralytic agents, potassium chloride, or sodium thiopental.191 Statutes
designating other methods of execution are similarly general, referring to
“electrocution,”192 “firing squad,”193 “lethal gas,”194 or “hanging,” and granting
the state’s department of corrections substantial decision-making authority.195
Most method of execution statutes rarely address pain in the execution
process. The few statutes that do refer to pain typically offer general statements

185 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1014(D) (providing that if lethal injection, nitrogen

hypoxia, and electrocution are unconstitutional or “otherwise unavailable, then the sentence
of death shall be carried out by firing squad”); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-51(4) (alternative
if lethal injection, nitrogen hypoxia, and electrocution are unconstitutional or unavailable);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-5.5(3) (West 2012).
186 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-18-82.1(c); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 922.105(3); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2949.22(C) (West 2020); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-23-114(d).
187 See ALA. CODE § 15-18-82.1(a).
188 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1014(A).
189 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-757(A) (2020); see also CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 3604(a) (West 2020); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4001(a) (West 2020); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
ANN. art. 43.14(a) (West 2019).
190 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4001(c); NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-964 (West 2020); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 176.355 (West 2020); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 43.14(a); VA.
CODE ANN. § 53.1-234 (West 2020); see also Eric Berger, Lethal Injection and the Problem
of Constitutional Remedies, 27 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 259, 303 (2009) (discussing state
statutes that direct substantial discretion to agencies).
191 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-617(c) (2020); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-51(1) (West 2020);
OR. REV. STAT. § 137.473(1) (West 2020); PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4304(a)(1)
(West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-19-10(2) (West 2020); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 7-13-904(a)
(West 2020); see also infra note 222 and accompanying text.
192 See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
193 UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-18-5.5(3).
194 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-757(B); CAL. PENAL CODE § 3604(a). Alabama,
Oklahoma, and Mississippi specifically identify “nitrogen hypoxia” as the method of
execution for gas. See ALA. CODE § 15-18-82.1(a) (2020); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-51(2);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1014(B) (West 2020).
195 See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 546.720 (West 2020); S.C. CODE ANN. § 24-3-530
(2020).
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that drugs should “quickly and painlessly cause death,”196 or “cause death in a
swift and humane manner.”197
Inmates’ nondelegation challenges to state method of execution statutes
contend that the grant of broad discretion to the department of corrections to
create execution protocols lacks a sufficient intelligible principle or policy
determination and represents an unconstitutional delegation of pure legislative
power.198 Even states using “strong” nondelegation approaches, such as Florida
and Texas,199 have rejected these arguments.200 Arkansas is the sole jurisdiction
to have concluded that its method of execution statute represented an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power.201
This Part recounts previous nondelegation challenges to death penalty
litigation. Part A centers on the litigation in Arkansas in Jones that found a
separation of powers violation. Part B examines litigation in other jurisdictions
that upheld broad delegation to correctional agencies to create protocols.

A. The Arkansas Method of Execution Act and Nondelegation
In 2010, a group of death row inmates in Arkansas challenged the
constitutionality of the Arkansas Method of Execution Act (AMEA).202 They
asserted that the AMEA violated the Arkansas Constitution’s separation of
powers doctrine because it unconstitutionally delegated the Arkansas
Department of Correction (ADC) “unfettered discretion” to select lethal
injection chemicals and other execution-related policies.203 The AMEA selected
“intravenous lethal injection” of “one . . . or more chemicals, as determined in
kind and amount in the discretion of the Director of the Department of
Correction” as the state’s method of execution.204 It provided a list the director
could choose from, including “ultra-short-acting barbiturates,” “chemical
paralytic agents,” “[p]otassium chloride,” as well as “[a]ny other chemical or
chemicals . . . .”205 The circuit court found the AMEA unconstitutional and
struck the catch-all phrase.206

196 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §2949.22(A) (2020).
197 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4001(a) (2020); see also MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-51(1).
198 Hobbs v. Jones, 412 S.W.3d 844, 854 (Ark. 2012).
199 See Rossi, supra note 118, at 1193–95.
200 See Diaz v. State, 945 So. 2d 1136, 1143 (Fla. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by

Darling v. State, 45 So.3d 444 (Fla. 2010); see also Ex parte Granviel, 561 S.W.3d 503, 514
(Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc).
201 See Hobbs, 412 S.W.3d at 854; see also infra Part III.A.
202 Hobbs, 412 S.W.3d at at 847.
203 Id. at 847–50.
204 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5–4–617(a)(1) (West 2011).
205 Id. § 5–4–617(a)(2).
206 Hobbs, 412 S.W.3d at 849.

952

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 81:5

The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed and struck the entire statute as
facially unconstitutional because it was not severable.207 Arkansas’s legislature
may delegate discretionary authority to other branches, such as the power to
determine facts or to act in response to a contingency the statute identifies.208
Provided the law was “mandatory in all it requires and all it determines,”209 it
did not violate separation of powers principles if the legislature designated
certain state officials or agencies to put the law into operation.210 The legislature
had to enact “appropriate standards by which the administrative body is to
exercise th[e delegated] power” before delegating discretionary power to an
agency or official.211 But, the court cautioned, “[a] statute that, in effect, reposes
an absolute, unregulated, and undefined discretion in an administrative agency
bestows arbitrary powers and is an unlawful delegation of legislative
powers.”212
The court concluded that the AMEA gave ADC the “absolute discretion” to
determine the kind and amount of chemicals to be used for lethal injection,
without offering any guidance in selecting the chemicals.213 The AMEA did not
create a mandatory directive—ADC could choose (or decline) to use any of the
listed drugs.214 While the legislature could give ADC the power to make factual
determinations or decisions in contingencies, the AMEA “g[ave] the ADC the
power to decide all the facts and all the contingencies with no reasonable
guidance given absent the generally permissive use of one or more
chemicals.”215 Coupled with ADC’s unlimited discretion to set all policies and
procedures to conduct executions, there was “no guidance and no general policy
with regard to the procedures for the ADC to implement lethal injections.”216
207 Id. at 855. The circuit court apparently reasoned that the reference to “any other
chemical or chemicals” would eliminate much of the uncertainty in the statute. Id. at 849.
The Arkansas Supreme Court concluded that the language the circuit court struck did not
have a “practical effect” on the statute because the remainder of the statute gave the ADC
“absolute discretion.” Id. at 855.
208 Id. at 851 (citing State v. Davis, 10 S.W.2d 513, 514 (Ark. 1928)).
209 State v. Davis, 10 S.W.2d 513, 514 (Ark. 1928).
210 Hobbs v. Jones, 412 S.W.3d 844, 851 (Ark. 2012) (quoting State v. Davis, 10 S.W.2d
513, 514 (Ark. 1928)); see also Ark. Sav. & Loans Ass’n Bd. v. West Helena Sav. & Loan
Ass’n, 538 S.W.2d 560, 564–67 (Ark. 1976)).
211 Hobbs, 412 S.W.3d at 852.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 853–54 (noting that “may” is discretionary and observing that “the list of
chemicals is not exhaustive and includes, as an option, broad language that ‘any other
chemical or chemicals’ may be used” (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-617(a)(2)(D) (Supp.
2011))). Before the 2009 amendments, the AMEA provided that “[t]he punishment of death
is to be administered by a continuous intravenous injection of a lethal quality of an ultrashort-acting barbiturate in combination with a chemical paralytic agent until the defendant’s
death is pronounced according to accepted standards of medical practice.” ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 5-4-617 (repealed 2009).
214 Hobbs, 412 S.W.3d at 854.
215 Id. at 854.
216 Id.
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The court also declined to read the prohibitions on cruel and unusual punishment
in the Arkansas and U.S. Constitutions as “reasonable guidance” for ADC.217
The General Assembly’s failure to provide specific guidance in statutes violated
the separation of powers “and other constitutional provisions cannot provide a
cure.”218
The Jones dissent grounded its objection in majoritarian perspectives: every
other nondelegation case had reached the opposite conclusion, and many other
states’ method of execution statutes gave departments of corrections even
broader discretion to select lethal injection drugs and carry out executions.219
Like other states, discussed infra, the dissent concluded it was sufficient for the
AMEA to define the punishment and express the legislature’s intent to impose
that punishment.220 Granting ADC the discretion to figure out the methodology
and chemicals was appropriate because ADC was “better qualified” to make the
decision and it was “impracticable” for the General Assembly to do it.221
After Jones, the Arkansas Legislature amended the AMEA in 2013,
adopting a single-drug barbiturate protocol that also required ADC to administer
a benzodiazepine222 to the inmate before initiating the execution.223 Inmates
again brought nondelegation claims, including allegations that the amended
AMEA did not constrain ADC’s discretion in drug administration, selection,
and training members of the execution team.224 When that case, Hobbs v.

217 Id.
218 Id.
219 See id. at 858–60 (Baker, J., dissenting). The dissent also relied on the Eighth

Circuit’s conclusion in Nooner v. Norris, 594 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2010), that Arkansas’s
lethal-injection protocol did not violate the Eighth Amendment in part because it was
consistent with the three-drug protocol that other states used. See Hobbs, 412 S.W.3d at 861
(Baker, J., dissenting); see also Nooner, 594 F.3d at 601, 608.
220 Hobbs, 412 S.W.3d at 861 (Baker, J., dissenting).
221 Id. (“The execution of this law is precisely the type of delegation of ‘details with
which it is impracticable for the legislature to deal directly.’”) (quoting Leathers v. Gulf Rice
Ark., Inc., 994 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Ark. 1999).
222 Benzodiazepines are a class of “[C]entral [N]ervous [S]ystem depressants
that . . . [have] sedative, and muscle-relaxing properties.” What Are Central Nervous System
Depressants?, ADDICTION CTR., https://www.addictioncenter.com/drugs/drug-classifica
tions/central-nervous-system-depressants/#:~:text=Sometimes%20called%20%E2%80%9
Cbenzos%2C%E2%80%9D%20benzodiazepines,Valium%2C%20Xanax%2C%20and%20
Ativan [https://perma.cc/MUQ5-424W]. The ADC described benzodiazepines as “a class of
drugs known for their anti-anxiety and anticonvulsant properties.” Hobbs v. McGehee, 458
S.W.3d 707, 716 n.5 (Ark. 2015).
223 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-617(b) (West 2013); S.B. 237, 89th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. § 1 (Ark. 2013). The Arkansas General Assembly has amended the statute two more
times since then. See S.B. 464, 92d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 3 (Ark. 2019); H.B. 1751,
90th Gen. Assemb, Reg. Sess. §§ 1–2 (Ark. 2015). The amendments changed the type of
drugs that could be used in an execution but require ADC to choose between a single-drug
or three-drug protocol based on drug availability. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-617(c).
224 McGehee, 458 S.W.3d at 710.
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McGehee,225 reached the Arkansas Supreme Court, the court reversed course
from Jones.226
Designating barbiturates as the lethal agent channeled ADC’s discretion
because the legislature could constitutionally grant an agency the power to select
from “specific legislatively approved options.”227 The legislature had crafted a
more precise set of directives for executions and given ADC a targeted mandate
to develop regulations surrounding capital punishment.228 The court relied on
Baze v. Rees,229 to conclude that the amended AMEA did not need to set training
and qualifications for execution teams.230 In Baze, inmates contended that
inadequate facilities and training created a risk that execution teams would
improperly administer thiopental, causing severe pain.231 The Supreme Court
relied on the trial court’s factual findings that it was easy to follow directions to
prepare the drug, and that the execution protocol set qualifications for
executioners in concluding that Kentucky’s protocol did not risk severe pain.232
McGehee’s willingness to mix Eighth Amendment holdings with separation of
powers analyses may be explained by the authoring justice, who had dissented
in Jones in part because she thought constitutional principles prohibiting cruel
and unusual punishments narrowed agency discretion.233
The transition from Jones to McGehee can be explained in part by the
amendments to the AMEA, which addressed some of the court’s criticisms in
Jones by setting mandatory standards and more specific criteria for execution
protocols.234 But the McGehee dissent contended that identifying classes of
drugs alone did not provide reasonable guidelines because of variability in drug
onset and length of effect.235 The McGehee majority, by contrast, was more
willing to credit agency expertise and resume a majoritarian position in the
context of the death penalty and nondelegation.236
225 458 S.W.3d 707 (Ark. 2015).
226 Id. at 718.
227 Id. at 716–17 (“Here, the legislature has afforded reasonable guidelines by limiting

the ADC’s discretion to barbiturates, rather than permitting the ADC to consider any drug
of any class.”).
228 Id. at 717.
229 Id. at 718 (citing Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 45 (2008)).
230 McGehee, 458 S.W.3d at 718 (citing Hooker v. Parkin, 357 S.W.2d 534, 538 (Ark.
1962)).
231 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 54 (2008).
232 Id. at 54–55.
233 See Hobbs v. Jones, 412 S.W.3d 844, 861 (Ark. 2012) (Baker, J., dissenting)
(“[A]ppellants’ discretion is not ‘unfettered’ because they are at all times bound by the
constraints of our federal and state constitutions against cruel and unusual punishment.”).
234 See supra note 223 (discussing amendments to the AMEA).
235 McGehee, 458 S.W.3d at 721 (Wynne, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“Ultra-short-acting barbiturates can cause a person to lose consciousness within seconds,
while a long-acting barbiturate may take considerably longer to take effect.”).
236 See Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference, supra note 14, at 17; Corinna Barrett
Lain, The Unexceptionalism of “Evolving Standards”, 57 UCLA L. REV. 365, 413–14
(2009).
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B. Nondelegation Challenges to Method of Execution Statutes
Ex parte Granviel, decided in 1978, is the earliest case in which an inmate
raised a nondelegation claim.237 Texas’s lethal injection statute, enacted in
1977, called for execution by “intravenous injection of a substance or substances
in a lethal quantity sufficient to cause death and until such convict is dead,” to
be “determined and supervised by the Director of the Department of
Corrections.”238 Granviel asserted that this broad provision gave the director
legislative authority in violation of the Texas Constitution.239
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged the legislature’s
responsibility to “declar[e] a policy and fix[] a primary standard” before giving
the power to an agency to “establish rules, regulations, or minimum standards
reasonably necessary to carry out the expressed purpose of the act.”240 It
concluded that, by choosing the death penalty, selecting a method and time of
execution, and designating someone to set execution procedure, the legislature
had sufficiently cabined the director’s discretion.241 The court afforded
significant deference to the legislature’s decision to delegate, and the director’s
presumed expertise in addressing details that the legislature could not
“practically or efficiently” do itself.242
Granviel also connected the regularity of administrative procedures to the
question of delegation.243 Although at that time lethal injection was a brandnew method of execution, the court relied on a vaguely worded affidavit from
the director to conclude that his choice of drugs was “informed.”244 The
director’s assertion that he had consulted with “people familiar with lethal
substances”245 in making his decision showed his compliance with the “basic
principle” of administrative law to “ascertain[] facts to support the final choice
of the substance,” despite an absence of any real detail on how he had made that
choice.246
Granviel became the template for nondelegation claims that followed. Like
the Jones dissent, courts relied on Granviel to conclude nondelegation was not
viable.247 For example, in State v. Osborn, the Idaho Supreme Court observed,
237 Ex parte Granviel, 561 S.W.2d 503, 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc).
238 H.B. No. 945, 65th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. § 1 (Tex. 1977).
239 Granviel, 561 S.W.2d at 514.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 515.
242 Id.
243 See id. at 514
244 Id. at 515; id. at 507–08 (quoting the complete affidavit); see also BANNER, supra

note 36, at 297.
245 Granviel, 561 S.W.2d at 508.
246 Id. at 515.
247 Zink v. Lombardi, No. 2:12-cv-4209-NKL, 2012 WL 12828155, at *6 (W.D. Mo.
Nov. 16, 2012); Sims v. Kernan, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d 300, 308–09 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018); Sims
v. State, 754 So. 2d 657, 668–69 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam); State v. Osborn, 631 P.2d 187,
201 (Idaho 1981); State v. Ellis, 799 N.W.2d 267, 289, 289 nn.51–52 (Neb. 2011).
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“This matter was disposed of in Ex parte Granviel,” quoted the opinion at
length, and concluded it, too, would assume its director of corrections would
behave reasonably without analyzing Idaho’s separation of powers doctrine.248
Other jurisdictions, including Florida, Nebraska, California, Arizona, and a
federal district court in Missouri, have placed heavy reliance on other
nondelegation decisions, although they typically offer more legal analysis than
Osborn.249 This kind of approach is common in state constitutional law and
death penalty jurisprudence. Courts rely on statistics on, inter alia, judicial
decisions in capital sentencing to show “reliable objective evidence of
contemporary values” to evaluate whether a punishment comports with
“evolving standards of decency.”250 It can also be seen from courts’ reliance on
the Supreme Court’s preemptive approval of the Baze three-drug protocol for
other states’ execution protocols.251 If enough states seem to have adopted a
particular method, courts tend to accept it—and an accompanying broad
delegation—more readily, without assessing particular agencies’ internal
decision-making.252 Eric Berger observes that the use of “state counting” in
evaluating the permissibility of execution protocols in Baze is “exceedingly
deferential” without considering whether “state practices should be
probative.”253
When it comes to evaluating the constitutional scope of legislative
delegation to agencies, courts, perhaps wary of imposing countermajoritarian
decisions on legislative action, do not consider whether state legislatures’ broad
delegations undermine important democratic values and instead rely on
numbers.254 Rossi criticizes this approach because courts often fail to address
distinctions between other jurisdictions’ governmental and constitutional
structure and their own.255 Courts’ reliance on the Granviel line of precedent
248 Osborn, 631 P.2d at 201.
249 See, e.g., Zink, 2012 WL 12828155, at *6–8; Ellis, 799 N.W.2d at 289, 289 nn.51–

52; Cook v. State, 281 P.3d 1053, 1056 n.4 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012); Kernan, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d
at 308–09; Diaz v. State, 945 So. 2d 1136, 1143 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam); Sims, 754 So. 2d
at 668–69 (per curiam).
250 Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330–31 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia,
536 U.S. 304 (2002); see also Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 426 (2008); Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564–67 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 314–16 (2002);
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 789–93 (1982); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593–96
(1977).
251 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 61 (2008) (“A State with a lethal injection protocol
substantially similar to the protocol we uphold today would not create a risk that meets this
standard.”); see also Nooner v. Norris, 594 F.3d 592, 597, 599, 601, 608 (8th Cir. 2010);
Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference, supra note 14, at 13 (discussing “preemptive
deference”).
252 See Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference, supra note 14, at 17.
253 Id.
254 See id. at 14.
255 See Rossi, supra note 118, at 1233 (“In many state cases, separation of powers
analysis becomes a counting game—a “me[]-tooism”—where a court simply cites the
number of state opinions accepting a certain type of statute and the number rejecting it,
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leads them to rapidly dismiss Jones without assessing if their separation of
powers doctrines are more similar to Arkansas or to other states’ doctrines.256
In determining whether legislatures have established sufficient policy, most
courts conclude that legislatures have complied by adopting the penalty and
picking a general method of execution, and occasionally, by identifying the
agency or official to create the protocol or carry out the execution.257 One
difficulty with this analysis is that courts sometimes conflate one policy decision
(whether a particular crime merits the death penalty) with another (the method
of execution).
Sims v. Kernan illustrates this problem. The California Court of Appeals
suggested that the legislature had spent sufficient time on policy decisions to
guide the corrections agency because it had addressed other aspects of the death
penalty, such as capital trial procedure; the location of death row; allowing the
inmate to choose between lethal gas and lethal injection; identifying witnesses;
and voluntary physician attendance.258 Sims did not clarify how these decisions
set standards an agency could use to evaluate whether it had complied with the
legislative policy when it selected lethal drugs or gas for executions—or if these
enactments could guide agency decision-making about pain.
To overcome this hurdle, courts have relied on state or federal constitutional
requirements to constrain agency discretion.259 In Cook v. State, the Arizona

usually as support for siding with the majority of states having previously considered the
issue.”) (footnote omitted); see also John P. Frank, Book Review, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1339,
1340 (1985) (reviewing Developments in State Constitutional Law (Bradley D. McGraw ed.,
1985), and State Supreme Courts: Policymakers in the Federal System (Mary Cornelia Porter
& G. Alan Tarr eds., 1982)).
256 See, e.g., Zink v. Lombardi, No. 2:12-cv-4209-NKL, 2012 WL 12828155, at *7
(W.D. Mo. Nov. 16, 2012); Sims v. Kernan, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d 300, 308–9 (Cal. Ct. App.
2018). Only Zink evaluated whether Missouri’s separation of powers doctrine was consistent
with Arkansas’s to determine if Jones was persuasive. Id.
257 See Zink, 2012 WL 12828155, at *8 (concluding that Missouri’s legislature had
established a general policy by identifying the method for executions); Cook v. State, 281
P.3d 1053, 1055–56 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012) (concluding that appointing the Department of
Corrections to supervise executions and specifying the method was a sufficient standard to
guide the Department); Kernan, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 305–06 (identifying the legislative
policy as using lethal gas or lethal injection to implement executions); Diaz v. State, 945 So.
2d 1136, 1145 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam) (relying on Sims); Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657, 670
(Fla. 2000) (per curiam) (explaining that the statute “clearly defines the punishment to be
imposed” and “makes clear that the legislative purpose is to impose death”); State v. Ellis,
799 N.W.2d 267, 289 (Neb. 2011) (relying on other jurisdictions’ analyses to conclude that
the legislature declared a policy and set a “primary standard” by identifying the purpose of
the statute, the punishment, and a general means); Brown v. Vail, 237 P.3d 263, 269 (Wash.
2010) (en banc) (explaining that the legislature had sufficiently identified policy by
identifying the method and place of execution and which officials set execution protocols
and supervised executions).
258 Kernan, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 307.
259 See Cook, 281 P.3d at 1056; Kernan, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 305; see also Ex parte
Granviel, 561 S.W.2d 503, 513 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc) (presuming that the
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Court of Appeals explained that the federal Constitution “implicitly guides and
limits the Department’s discretion” because the Department’s protocols had to
comply with a constitutional requirement that execution protocols avoid a
substantial risk of serious harm, pain, and suffering.260 This conclusion is
questionable. Legislative enactments may not violate constitutions and agencies
are already required to comply with constitutional limitations on punishment in
conducting executions.261 Therefore a reliance on constitutional restrictions
does not meaningfully limit the discretion legislators confer on agencies.262
In rejecting nondelegation arguments, courts also rely on the argument that
agencies, not legislatures, are better equipped to develop execution protocols.263
Courts may emphasize the technical nature of execution protocols and the need
for continuous decision-making.264 Cook asserted that it was “impracticable”
for the legislature to create a protocol, pointing to Arizona’s execution
protocols, which “span[] 35 pages” and set procedures for a thirty-five day
period leading up to the execution and the execution that required coordination
with multiple government agencies, law enforcement, and the media.265 These
analyses assume that corrections agencies have the requisite expertise to make
these determinations.266 Deference to presumed agency expertise in a separation
of powers analysis muddies the distinction between constitutionally permissible
delegation and administrative competence.267 This deference is also often
misplaced. As discussed infra, agencies often develop protocols without
medical expertise or rely on other states’ protocols without engaging in their
own fact-finding.268
Director of the Department of Corrections will comply with constitutional requirements in
selecting the drugs to be used in lethal injection).
260 Cook, 281 P.3d at 1056 (citing Dickens v. Brewer, 631 F.3d 1139, 1144 (9th Cir.
2011)).
261 See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 38–39 (2008).
262 See infra notes 393–426 and accompanying text.
263 See, e.g., Zink v. Lombardi, No. 2:12-cv-4209-NKL, 2012 WL 12828155, at *8
(W.D. Mo. Nov. 16, 2012); Kernan, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 307; Granviel, 561 S.W.2d at 515;
Diaz v. State, 945 So. 2d 1136, 1143 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam); Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657,
670 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam); State v. Ellis, 799 N.W.2d 267, 289 (Neb. 2011).
264 Ellis, 799 N.W.2d at 289.
265 Cook, 281 P.3d at 1056 (“It contains detailed instructions on the various chemicals
to be used, how they should be administered by Department personnel, and how the
execution will be supervised and regulated.”).
266 Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference, supra note 14, at 38; Daniel J. Solove,
The Darkest Domain: Deference, Judicial Review, and the Bill of Rights, 84 IOWA L. REV.
941, 969 (1999).
267 Eric Berger, Individual Rights, Judicial Deference, and Administrative Law Norms
in Constitutional Decision Making, 91 B.U. L. REV. 2029, 2057–58 (2011) (asserting that
agencies should not receive deference in constitutional inquiries when they operate outside
“[a]dministrative law norms”).
268 See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 75 (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring) (concluding that
protocols are a product of “‘administrative convenience’ . . . rather than a careful analysis of
relevant considerations favoring or disfavoring a conclusion”); see also infra Part V.B.
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Departments of corrections also receive a presumption that the discretion
accompanying broad delegation will not lead to arbitrary decision-making.269
Courts’ reliance on the existence of procedural safeguards to approve delegation
is jarringly inconsistent with reality. Many jurisdictions exempt their execution
protocols, or even their department of corrections, from state administrative
procedure rules.270 This, as Berger points out, increases the risk that “the
officials in charge of the procedure will throw something together haphazardly
and without serious reflection on the constitutional issues.”271 Prisoners have
argued that the absence of policy and lack of administrative procedure give
agencies unconstitutionally broad discretion, to little avail.272 The Washington
Supreme Court acknowledged the importance of adequate procedural
safeguards for constitutional legislative delegation in criminal contexts:
promulgating rules pursuant to Washington’s APA that include either an appeal
process before the agency or judicial review, and the “procedural safeguards
normally available to a criminal defendant remain.”273
Despite the fact that Washington’s Department of Corrections was exempt
from the state APA, the court concluded that procedural safeguards for
promulgating execution protocols were met because prisoners could seek
269 See State v. Deputy, 644 A.2d 411, 420 (Del. Super. Ct. 1994), aff’d, 648 A.2d 423
(Del. 1994) (presuming that the Department of Corrections will properly perform its duties);
State v. Osborn, 631 P.2d 187, 201 (Idaho 1981) (“[W]e will not assume that the director of
the department of corrections will act in other than a reasonable manner.”); Ex Parte
Granviel, 561 S.W.2d 503, 513, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en banc) (rejecting the
presumption that the Director of the Department of Corrections will act in an “arbitrary”
manner).
270 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3604.1(a) (West 2020) (“The Administrative
Procedure Act shall not apply to standards, procedures, or regulations promulgated pursuant
to Section 3604.”); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 150B–1(d)(6) (West 2020); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 2.2-4002(B)(9) (West 2020) (exempting agency action relating to “[i]nmates of prisons or
other such facilities or parolees therefrom”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 34.05.030(1)(c)
(West 2020) (state APA does not apply to the department of corrections with respect to
persons in the department’s custody or subject to their jurisdictions); In re Fed. Bureau of
Prisons’ Execution Protocol Cases, 955 F.3d 106, 142 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (Rao, J., concurring);
Hill v. Owens, 738 S.E.2d 56, 59–60 (Ga. 2013); Conner v. N.C. Council of State, 716 S.E.2d
836, 845–46 (N.C. 2011) (holding that the Council of State’s approval of North Carolina’s
lethal injection protocol is not subject to the APA); Abdur’Rahman v. Bredesen, 181 S.W.3d
292, 311–12 (Tenn. 2005) (state corrections department does not have to adopt lethal
injection protocol consistently with Tennessee APA); Porter v. Commonwealth, 661 S.E.2d
415, 432–33 (Va. 2008). Other courts have held that administrative procedures apply when
promulgating execution protocols, but these are the exception, rather than the norm. See
Bowling v. Ky. Dep’t of Corr., 301 S.W.3d 478, 488 (Ky. 2009); Evans v. State, 914 A.2d
25, 34 (Md. 2006).
271 Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference, supra note 14, at 60.
272 See Diaz v. State, 945 So. 2d 1136, 1143 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam); Granviel, 561
S.W.2d at 515; Brown v. Vail, 237 P.3d 263, 269–70 (Wash. 2010) (en banc); see also
Coglianese, supra note 120, at 1868 (explaining that compliance with administrative
procedure may be a component of nondelegation inquiries per Schechter Poultry).
273 Brown, 237 P.3d at 270.
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judicial review through lawsuits challenging execution methods and because the
prisoners had received constitutional process during their trial and death
sentence.274 Procedural safeguards attached to criminal convictions bear limited
relevance to procedural processes in creating execution policies. Reliance on
judicial review is problematic because it reinforces legislative abdication.
Franklin Zimring and Gordon Hawkins have demonstrated that the
availability of engaged judicial review in capital punishment post-Gregg
allowed state legislatures to pass responsibility to the judiciary, and once the
trend had shifted, “traditional mechanisms of restraint had been literally
abandoned.”275 Courts retain some of the burden that legislators have handed
over. In Diaz v. State, the Florida Supreme Court brushed aside criticisms that
the Department of Corrections was exempt from Florida’s APA. “In light of the
exigencies inherent in the execution process,” the court explained, judicial
review was “preferable” to administrative review.276 In other words, the
judiciary would limit the Department’s authority, therefore the discretion the
legislature had granted was within constitutional bounds.277
But agencies’ wide discretion may interfere with judicial review. In addition
to their unsuccessful nondelegation claim, Arizona prisoners argued in Cook
that the unlimited authority of the Arizona Department of Corrections to set and
revise execution protocols interfered with the judicial branch and violated the
separation of powers doctrine.278 The Department repeatedly changed its
execution protocols shortly before carrying out executions—in one case,
eighteen hours before a scheduled execution.279 The Arizona Court of Appeals
“agree[d]” that the Department’s recent habit of swapping protocols “at the last
minute raise[d] constitutional concerns, as well as a separation of powers
concern under the Arizona Constitution” by “threaten[ing] to prevent
meaningful judicial review.”280 Shifting execution protocols left courts to
address complex, fact-intensive constitutional questions in a short period of
time, potentially obstructing judicial review and interfering with the duties of
the judicial branch.281
274 Id.
275 FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING & GORDON HAWKINS, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE

AMERICAN AGENDA 100 (1986).
276 Diaz v. State, 945 So. 2d 1136, 1143 (Fla. 2006) (per curiam).
277 See id. at 1143–44; see also Rachel E. Barkow, Essay, The Ascent of the
Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1332, 1356–57 (2008).
278 Cook v. State, 281 P.3d 1053, 1056 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012).
279 Lopez v. Brewer, 680 F.3d 1068, 1070–71 (9th Cir. 2012); Towery v. Brewer, 672
F.3d 650, 653 (9th Cir. 2012); Cook, 281 P.3d at 1056–57 (citing, inter alia, Order, State v.
Beaty, No. CR-85-0211-AP/PC (Ariz. May 25, 2011)).
280 Cook, 281 P.3d at 1057 (footnote omitted). Last minute protocol changes “raised
serious concerns under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual
punishment,” the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as that
Amendment’s “guarantee of an inmate’s right to in-person visits with counsel . . . .” Id. at
1057 n.5.
281 Id. at 1058.
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The court ultimately concluded that, although the Department was on thin
ice, it “ha[d] not yet violated the Arizona Constitution’s separation of powers
doctrine” because courts could provide review (even if rushed).282 The court
also assumed the Department’s new protocol, which required seven days’
written notice to the inmate identifying which lethal injection drugs the
Department would use in an execution, would solve the problem.283 Although
seven days was “relatively short,” it improved upon the one or two days’ notice
the Department had provided in the past.284 The protocol provided that the
director of the Department could deviate from the protocols at his or her
discretion at any time, likely prompting the court’s warning that if the
Department continued its practices in a way that interfered with judicial review,
the court might reconsider its holding.285
Courts also appear reluctant to address nondelegation challenges in part
because of their novelty. In Sims v. State, the Florida Supreme Court rejected a
nondelegation challenge to Florida’s lethal-injection statute in part because the
previous version of the statute authorizing electrocution as the method of
execution had not identified “the precise means, manner or amount of voltage
to be applied.”286 Although there are instances in which electrocution statutes
may permit delegation challenges,287 the court did not consider significant
differences between the two methods of execution. The task of selecting drugs
for executions, a quasi-medical procedure, carries significantly more discretion
and involves different decision-making processes and factual inquiries than
electrocution.
It is certainly possible that the subject matter tilts courts’ decisions—courts
that tend to uphold death sentences may be more reticent to apply their states’
nondelegation doctrines or more willing to tolerate broad delegation.288 Florida
and Texas, for example, are death penalty strongholds.289 Of course, so is

282 Id.
283 Id. (explaining that new notice requirements, “if implemented by the Department,

should help ensure meaningful judicial review . . . ”).
284 Id. at 1058.
285 Id.
286 Sims v. State, 754 So. 2d 657, 670 (Fla. 2000) (per curiam).
287 See Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death, supra note 14, at 88 (discussing
rulings that Nebraska’s electrocution execution protocols appeared to violate state law).
288 See Dan Levine & Kristina Cooke, In States with Elected High Court Judges, a
Harder Line on Capital Punishment, REUTERS (Sept. 22, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/
investigates/special-report/usa-deathpenalty-judges/ [https://perma.cc/3DEA-ABCS].
289 See GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE, supra note 3, at 138–39 (discussing geographic use
of the death penalty); JON SORENSEN & ROCKY LEANN PILGRIM, LETHAL INJECTION: CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN TEXAS DURING THE MODERN ERA 16 (2006) (stating that Texas sentenced
925 people to death between 1973 and 2002); id. at 18–19 (discussing Texas’s capital
punishment system).
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Arkansas, rendering Jones a particularly intriguing deviation.290 Jones
embraced a formalist perspective on separation of powers in holding that the
legislature had to do more to curb agency discretion in creating execution
protocols.291 Formalism, or strong nondelegation approaches, evince
majoritarian values, favoring legislative power by insisting that elected officials
make difficult policy determinations.292 Thus, requiring the Arkansas General
Assembly to select the applicable classes of lethal injection drugs forced the
legislature to engage more transparently with a fraught and controversial policy
issue.293
Functionalist, weak, or moderate approaches are also majoritarian because
a “deferential approach leaves the bulk of the responsibility for structural design
to the elected departments of government.”294 Some scholars contend that
agencies are accountable and transparent due to their processes,295 but the
secrecy and absence of administrative constraints on corrections agencies
undercuts those arguments in the capital-sentencing context. Cook illustrates
this problem quite precisely: agency flexibility created a substantial risk of
interference with the judiciary’s ability to carry out its duties.296
The separation of powers serves important functions in our system of
government. Allowing agencies to take up the task of making important policy
decisions without adequate legislative guidance, such as how the state will kill
those it has deemed unworthy of living, destabilizes those values. The lack of
legislative accountability and agency transparency undermines perceptions of
legitimacy of the punishment. Relevant administrative law norms heighten the
problem of broad delegation: agencies often lack expertise in crafting protocols,
they rely on other jurisdictions, and are exempt from many procedural
safeguards.

V. NONDELEGATING DEATH
As the previous parts of this Article have illustrated, delegating
responsibility is a central part of the history of the American death penalty,
current method of execution statutes, administrative protocols, and judicial
290 Between 1973 and 2002, Arkansas sentenced ninety-nine people to death. See
SORENSON & PILGRIM, supra note 293, at 16; see also LIFTON & MITCHELL, supra note 69,
at 100–01; SARAT, GRUESOME SPECTACLES, supra note 38, at 130–36.
291 See supra Part IV.A; see also Brown, supra note 115, at 1523–25.
292 Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference, supra note 14, at 38; Brown, supra note
115, at 1526.
293 See Murphy, supra note 10, at 837–39.
294 Brown, supra note 115, at 1528–29.
295 See, e.g., Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism:
Preemption, Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933,
1957 (2008); Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the Details, and the Dawn of the 21st Century
Administrative State: Beyond the New Deal, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 941, 1018 (2000); see also
Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference, supra note 14, at 43–44.
296 See Cook v. State, 281 P.3d 1053, 1058 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012).
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decision-making. Legislatures may initiate the process of broad delegation, but
the system of capital punishment is sustainable in part because of continued
delegation across juries, judges, departments of corrections, officials,
executioners, and the public.297
This Part explores the flaws in legislative delegations as well as courts’
analyses of the problem of delegating death. It contends that the nondelegation
doctrine offers important considerations such as accountability, transparency,
and legitimacy in governance to evaluate capital punishment. It evaluates
common problems in judicial review of nondelegation questions in capital
punishment, particularly deference to agency expertise. This Part concludes by
arguing that legislatures should not be allowed to delegate this significant policy
choice and frames out a more robust nondelegation analysis for evaluating
method of execution statutes.

A. Why Nondelegation?
This Article does not propose that legislatures should write exhaustive
execution protocols addressing every possible contingency.298 Some delegation
is inevitable and necessary in modern governance.299 Harold Bruff observes that
courts struggle with applying the nondelegation doctrine “because no one has
successfully articulated neutral principles for deciding how specific a particular
delegation should have to be.”300 But, as Justice Gorsuch pointed out in Gundy,
the Supreme Court has not entirely “abandoned the business of policing
improper legislative delegations[,]” but instead applied other doctrines to “rein
297 See BESSLER, KISS OF DEATH, supra note 77, at 119 (“Only because responsibility
for executions is spread so diffusely among the various actors in the criminal justice system
do judges and jurors feel permission to disavow responsibility for the sentences they
impose.”); LIFTON & MITCHELL, supra note 69, at 81–83; Dubber, supra note 14, at 547
(discussing the “distribution of responsibility” that is “crucial to the American system of
capital punishment”).
298 See BRUFF, supra note 121, at 140 (“The courts are properly reluctant to employ the
doctrine vigorously, because it involves a constitutional decision that overrides a
congressional judgment regarding the amount of discretion that should be accorded to the
executive in a particular context.”).
299 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see
also BRUFF, supra note 121, at 140 (discussing the difficulties inherent in a “revived” and
robust delegation doctrine); Madison, supra note 113, at 246 (discussing that the “legislative,
executive, and judiciary departments are by no means totally separate and distinct from each
other”); Araiza, supra note 117, at 236–37; Cass, supra note 120, at 155–58 (discussing
delegations of authority in early America).
300 See BRUFF, supra note 121, at 140; see also Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 415 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“[W]hile the doctrine of unconstitutional delegation is unquestionably a
fundamental element of our constitutional system, it is not an element readily enforceable by
the courts.”); Cass, supra note 120, at 181 (“The harder question is the line-drawing question:
how do courts distinguish impermissible delegations of legislative power from permitted
assignments of legal authority?”); Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 121, at 326–
27.
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in Congress’s efforts to delegate legislative power . . . .”301 Courts can, and do,
keep the balance between legislative and executive power.302 Unconstrained
discretion upsets the balance, especially in criminal and capital punishment.
Legislative accountability was a significant concern in Furman and the
reshaping of the American death penalty.303 The breadth of agencies’ discretion
to create execution protocols without real legislative guidance is another aspect
of the overarching problem of accountability and decision-making in capital
punishment.
Rachel Barkow has argued for “criminal law exceptionalism” in separation
of powers jurisprudence.304 Her work demonstrates the historical and
constitutional underpinnings that support an argument for strict separation of
powers in criminal law, including the division of functions in the criminal law
among each branch.305 The Framers favored limiting power to prevent abuse of
criminal process through the separation of powers.306 Death penalty
exceptionalism exists in criminal and constitutional law because “death is a
punishment different from all other sanctions in kind rather than degree.”307 The
state’s authority to impose criminal penalties arises from the power the people
invested in it. The state’s authority to kill flows from the same source.
Narrowing a jury’s discretion is necessary to ensure that sentences are
proportional to the offense.308 Constraining agency discretion ensures that the
proper parties are making the right decisions with the right process.309 Without
301 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2141 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); see
also supra note 120 and accompanying text.
302 See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2135–38 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
303 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 255–57 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); id.
at 309–10 (Potter, J., concurring); id. at 313–14 (White, J., concurring); see also Gregg v.
Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (“Furman mandates that where discretion is afforded a
sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether a human life should
be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably directed and limited so as to minimize
the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious action.”); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280, 303 (1976) (“North Carolina’s mandatory death penalty statute provides no standards
to guide the jury in its inevitable exercise of the power to determine which first-degree
murderers shall live and which shall die. And there is no way under the North Carolina law
for the judiciary to check arbitrary and capricious exercise of that power through a review of
death sentences.”); BANNER, supra note 36, at 261–64 (discussing Furman v. Georgia).
These schemes do not resolve the problem of extreme discretion—they merely shift it
elsewhere. See BANNER, supra note 36, at 273 (discussing the NAACP Legal Defense Fund’s
briefs in Gregg v. Georgia); GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE, supra note 3, at 137–40 (discussing
geographic disparity in the death penalty due in part to prosecutorial discretion).
304 Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 137, at 1012.
305 Id. at 1012–17.
306 Id. at 1017; see Hessick & Hessick, supra note 172, at 25–26.
307 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303–04; see also Furman, 408 U.S. at 286–89 (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
308 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).
309 See Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 121, at 339 (explaining that the
“link” between “individual rights and interests” and “institutional design” is preserved
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proper constraints at the different points of the capital-punishment process, there
is a risk of arbitrarily imposed death sentences,310 or arbitrarily selected methods
of execution.
Unconstrained agency discretion in the context of figuring out a method of
execution implicates three primary problems associated with separation of
powers: accountability, transparency, and the perception of legitimacy.311
Accountability addresses who is responsible for making decisions and who
receives the credit (or blame).312 Transparency relates to preserving democratic
values and inmates’ access to judicial review. A lack of transparency and
unlimited agency discretion in decisions about punishment and killing
undermines the legitimacy of government action.313
Accountability is a central value in the legitimacy of criminal punishment,
sentencing practices, and the state’s power to kill.314 As David Schoenbrod
points out, delegating allows legislators to claim the credit for purported benefits
for a statute and evade blame for burdens or negative consequences.315 By
authorizing the death penalty, legislators can claim to be tough on crime and
then blame the agency for flaws in administering penalty,316 or leave the mess

through “a requirement that certain controversial or unusual actions will occur only with
respect for the institutional safeguards introduced through the design of Congress”).
310 But see GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE, supra note 3, at 138–54; Jordan M. Steiker, The
Role of Constitutional Facts and Social Science Research in Capital Litigation: Is “Proof”
of Arbitrariness or Inaccuracy Relevant to the Constitutional Regulation of the American
Death Penalty?, in THE FUTURE OF AMERICA’S DEATH PENALTY: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT
GENERATION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT RESEARCH 23, 23–46 (Charles S. Lanier et al. eds.,
2009).
311 See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2144 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(explaining that changing regulations across administrations implicates fair notice and
SORNA allowed Congress to “claim credit” for dealing with sex offenders while letting the
Attorney General address a complicated problem); SCHOENBROD, supra note 118, at 14–19;
Whittington & Iuliano, The Myth of the Nondelegation Doctrine, supra note 122, at 412.
312 See Hessick & Hessick, supra note 172, at 29–30; Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons,
supra note 121, at 319–20.
313 See Barkow, Ascent of the Administrative State, supra note 277, at 1336.
314 See Andrea Roth, “Spit and Acquit”: Prosecutors as Surveillance Entrepreneurs,
107 CALIF. L. REV. 405, 447 (2019) (discussing accountability and legitimacy). Roth
emphasizes that accountability also reflects democratic values and community norms. “A
practice is more likely to reflect community norms if the community has a chance to debate
the practice and, if the practice does not meet its ostensible policy goals, to lobby to change
or discontinue it.” Id.
315 SCHOENBROD, supra note 118, at 10.
316 See id. at 14 (“Delegation thus allows members of Congress to function as ministers
rather than legislators; they express popular aspirations and tend to their flocks rather than
make hard choices.”); see also Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 137, at 1030–31
(discussing why “the political system is biased in favor of more severe punishments”); Josh
Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1155 (2008) (discussing the
benefits legislators accrue by creating overbroad criminal statutes).
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to courts to sort out.317 Individuals convicted of capital offenses are a
“politically unpopular minority,”318 and legislators have little to lose and much
to gain by supporting the death penalty, even if its use is infrequent, arbitrary,
and riddled with error. Legislatures receive political capital for authorizing the
death penalty and accordingly should be accountable for that decision and the
inevitable consequences.319 To the extent that legislators reevaluate the death
penalty and alter a method of execution statute, they do so more frequently, as
Deborah Denno argues, “to stay one step ahead of a looming constitutional
challenge to that method because the acceptability of the death penalty process
itself therefore becomes jeopardized.”320 Legislative enactments on capital
punishment focus on continuing executions by preserving secrecy, accessing
tools or drugs for executions, and avoiding litigation, rather than humanitarian
and constitutional concerns.321
Broad delegation interferes with transparency and access to justice.322 Hugo
Bedau observes that, due to the secrecy surrounding executions, “the average
American literally does not know what is being done when the government, in
his name and presumably on his behalf, executes a criminal.”323 Secrecy and
unconstrained discretion contribute to delays in litigation and repeat litigation.
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Bucklew v. Precythe,324 refuted the majority
opinion’s complaints about litigation delays by pointedly observing that secrecy
317 See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 275, at 100 (discussing state legislatures’
freedom to pass “symbolic legislation” and evade responsibility).
318 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2144 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(noting that sex offenders are a “politically unpopular minority” and Congress could evade
the difficult question of what to do under SORNA by passing responsibility to the Attorney
General); see also Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 137, at 1029–31; Berger, In
Search of a Theory of Deference, supra note 14, at 61; Corinna Lain, Deciding Death, 57
DUKE L.J. 1, 4 (2007).
319 See ZIMRING & HAWKINS, supra note 275, at 100; Cass, supra note 120, at 154
(discussing political benefits to legislators).
320 Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death, supra note 14, at 65.
321 See SARAT, GRUESOME SPECTACLES, supra note 38, at 87–88 (discussing Florida’s
shift to lethal injection); id. at 118–20 (discussing the optics of lethal injection); Deborah W.
Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary, supra note 27, at 116 (2007); Denno, When
Legislatures Delegate Death, supra note 14, at 125; see also Interim Report No. 14 at 4, In
the Matter of the Multicounty Grand Jury, State of Okla., Nos. SCAD-2014-70, GJ-2014-1
(May 19, 2016), https://files.deathpenaltyinfo.org/legacy/files/pdf/MCGJ-Interim-Report-519-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/7G2Q-HKN7] [hereinafter Interim Multicounty Grand Jury
Report] (explaining that the Department of Corrections revised its execution protocols after
“complications” arising from Clayton Lockett’s execution).
322 See Berger, Individual Rights, supra note 267, at 2065–66 (explaining the importance
of transparency in judicial review of administrative decision-making); Hessick & Hessick,
supra note 172, at 34–36 (discussing how delegation exacerbates the “fiction” of “notice to
the public of their legal obligations”).
323 THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 14 (Hugo Adam Bedau, 3d ed. 1982).
324 See Bucklew v. Precythe, 139 S. Ct. 1112, 1145–48 (2019) (Sotomayor J.,
dissenting).
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surrounding execution protocols and changes to protocols (due in no small part
to agency discretion) leave inmates often unable to challenge protocols or
decisions about executions until close in time to executions.325 Cook illustrates
this point: the Arizona Department of Corrections’ discretion to make lastminute revisions to execution protocols threatened “to ‘usurp the powers,’ of
the Judiciary” by undermining its ability to engage in judicial review.326 Part of
the challenges of rapid judicial review may stem from courts’ unwillingness to
stay executions, but altering protocols immediately before execution or during
litigation unquestionably impacts judicial review, particularly when agencies
are not constrained by procedural or fact-finding requirements.
Excessive delegation and limited accountability and transparency
undermine the perception of the legitimacy of the death penalty. Delegation “is
closely connected both with the rule of law concept and the theory of
representative government.”327 Requiring legislation to have defining standards
“serves the function of ensuring that fundamental policy decisions will be made,
not by some appointed bureaucrats, but by the elected representatives of the
people.”328 Ronald Cass emphasizes that the question of legitimacy “goes
beyond Locke’s declaration that the people have not consented to a grant of
legislative power to others.”329 Instead, Cass contends that legitimacy is linked
to concerns about accountability: legislators benefit from granting power to
others, and that self-interest undermines legitimacy.330 Legislative enactments,
as opposed to agency determinations, may better reflect democratic, as opposed
to purely majoritarian, decision-making.331
To be sure, courts have emphasized that the Executive is directly
accountable to the people, and so that branch can reasonably make policy
determinations to “resolve the competing interests which Congress itself either
inadvertently did not resolve or intentionally left to be resolved by the agency
charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.”332
But majoritarian reasoning ignores the plight of politically unpopular groups.333
Delegating to administrative agencies the task of crafting execution protocols
325 See id. at 1147–48 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also generally KONRAD, supra

note 24.
326 Cook v. State, 281 P.3d 1053, 1058 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012); see also supra notes 277–
84 and accompanying text (discussing Cook).
327 Schwartz, supra note 120, at 445; Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 121,
at 320.
328 Schwartz, supra note 120, at 445.
329 Cass, supra note 120, at 153 (citing JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise of Government
§ 141, in TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 363 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1988) (1690)); see Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2133 (2019) (Gorsuch, J.,
dissenting).
330 See Cass, supra note 120, at 153–55.
331 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 118, at 110; Berger, In Search of a Theory of
Deference, supra note 14, at 43; Schwartz, supra note 120, at 445.
332 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984).
333 See SCHOENBROD, supra note 118, at 110–12.
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without legislative oversight or supervision undermines the legitimacy of the
punishment because secrecy and unconstrained discretion blur the lines between
legislative and executive power and eliminate checks on the exercise of
power.334 These harms stretch beyond the potential for cruelty and suffering in
administration of the death penalty—they also threaten the democratic process.
Although judicial enforcement via the nondelegation doctrine may magnify
the role of the judiciary, that branch has taken on an outsized role in part because
of legislative delegation and secrecy. The next part evaluates key aspects of
judicial inquiry into agency discretion to demonstrate why a more robust
nondelegation inquiry into legislative delegation in method of execution statutes
is necessary.

B. Agency Expertise and Limits on Discretion
Judicial review in nondelegation cases reveals unwarranted reliance on
agency expertise and willingness to gloss over existing separation of powers
principles. Courts tend to place too much reliance on the legislative decision to
adopt the death penalty, as well as a general choice of a method of execution.335
In Sims v. Kernan, the California Court of Appeals relied substantially on
legislative enactments unrelated to carrying out the death penalty to conclude
there was a sufficient policy.336 The court described agency protocols as
“subsidiary decisions” to the choice to impose the death penalty and the method,
rejecting litigants’ arguments that legislative policy should at a minimum
include decisions about “pain, speed, reliability, and transparency.”337
California’s separation of powers jurisprudence dictated that the legislative
body’s representative nature required it to settle contested policy matters and
crucial issues when it had the “time, information, and competence” to do so.338
The court did not disagree that the legislature could make those evaluations, but
concluded that lethal injection drug shortages justified institutional flexibility,
and the Department of Corrections would be in the “best position” to adjust
protocols in response to “lessons learned” from botched executions
nationally.339
This sort of reasoning misses the mark. The legislative decision to authorize
capital punishment is a separate policy judgment from how a sentence shall be
carried out, and both are legislative decisions. The death penalty, capital trial
procedure, or the location of death row do not set out factual inquiries for
agencies developing execution protocols to resolve or criteria to evaluate against

334 See Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 137, at 1023–24.
335 See Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death, supra note 14, at 70–71.
336 Sims v. Kernan, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d 300, 303, 306 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018); see supra

notes 257–58 and accompanying text.
337 Kernan, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 306.
338 Clean Air Constituency v. Cal. State Air Res. Bd., 523 P.2d 617, 627 (Cal. 1974).
339 Kernan, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 307.
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facts the agency must consider.340 Capital trial procedures do not resolve
procedural concerns about how execution protocols are developed.341
Generalized legislative statements about the goals of capital punishment do not
provide clear standards.342 These are inadequate substitutes for legislative
specificity, factual inquiry, and administrative procedures and guidance.343
Merely selecting a generic method of execution like lethal injection or lethal
gas may not offer sufficient guidance to an agency that develops protocols.
“Substance or substances in a lethal quantity sufficient to cause death”344 or
“lethal gas” encompass a range of gases and drugs that have varying effects on
the human body ranging from swift, slow, possibly painless, or excruciating
deaths.345 These methods carry substantial room for discretion and significant
potential for arbitrary action if agencies lack policy guidance or criteria from
the legislature. Generally worded statutes make it difficult to evaluate whether
the agency has complied with the legislature’s directive because it may not be
clear what the directive is other than ensuring that the condemned inmate dies.
A weaker approach to nondelegation preserves agency flexibility to respond
to developing situations. The Oklahoma legislators who drafted the first lethal
injection statute kept “the statutory language vague in order to accommodate the
development of new and better drug technologies in the future.”346 The
legislators did not include any oversight or specifications and the result was to
“delegate ‘to Oklahoma prison officials all critical decisions regarding the
implementation of lethal injection.’”347 But building this discretion into the
system incentivizes agencies to imitate without engaging in fact-finding or
assessments of whether another state’s protocols are actually effective. When
Oklahoma sought more recently to revise its protocols following Clayton
Lockett’s botched execution in 2014, the director of the Department of
Corrections “asked administration members to obtain public[ly] available
execution policies from other states, including Arizona, Florida, and Texas,
identify these states’ policies, and merge their best and most efficient practices
into the Department’s new Execution Protocol.”348
Agency competence is a distinct but interrelated issue from nondelegation
because courts substantially rely on agencies’ presumed expertise and position
340 See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct 2116, 2141 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
341 See id. at 2132; see also Hobbs v. Jones, 412 S.W.3d 844, 854 (Ark. 2012). But see

Kernan, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 307; Brown v. Vail, 237 P.3d 263, 270 (Wash. 2010) (en banc).
342 See Araiza, supra note 117, at 236 (“If one accepts such statements as furnishing
principles governing every delegation of power the statute accomplishes, then either nearly
every statute necessarily satisfies this supposedly-strengthened non-delegation review or we
are thrown back into the subjective ‘how intelligible does the principle have to be?’
inquiry.”).
343 Cf. Kernan, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 307; Brown, 237 P.3d at 269 (en banc).
344 E.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 43.14(a) (West 2019).
345 E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3604(a) (West 2020).
346 SARAT, GRUESOME SPECTACLES, supra note 38, at 117.
347 Id.
348 Interim Multicounty Grand Jury Report, supra note 321, at 5.
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in upholding broad legislative delegations.349 This inquiry misses a key step in
the analysis—whether the agency actually has the expertise. Denno has
demonstrated that the officials who develop execution protocols frequently lack
technical or medical expertise.350 This may be due to concerns over the ethics
of medical involvement in executions.351 Execution methods are not subjected
to medical or scientific study before their implementation and may be held to
lower standards than those used in animal euthanasia.352 The prevalence of
botched executions lends substantial support to the argument that there are
deficiencies in agencies’ procedures. Austin Sarat estimates that 7.12% of
lethal-injection executions have been botched, lending substantial support to
critiques of execution procedures.353 This may be, as Denno has explained,
“partly attributable to the dearth of written procedures provided to the
executioners concerning how to perform an execution.”354 Other factors in
botched executions may include inadequate training in administering drugs or
inserting IVs, particularly for individuals who are in poor health, are obese, or
have a history of drug abuse,355 as well as flaws in the drugs used.356
Agencies’ attempts to shift responsibility through the “discrete task”
approach discussed supra, may also lend itself to errors.357 Oklahoma’s
349 See supra notes 262–67 and accompanying text.
350 Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos Post-Baze, supra note 27, at 1335; Denno, When

Legislatures Delegate Death, supra note 14, at 112, 112 n.345; see Denno, The Lethal
Injection Quandary, supra note 27, at 116.
351 See SARAT, GRUESOME SPECTACLES, supra note 38, at 119–20; Ty Alper, The Truth
About Physician Participation in Lethal Injection Executions, 88 N.C. L. REV. 11, 48 (2009);
Denno, The Lethal Injection Quandary, supra note 27, at 113–14; Denno, When Legislatures
Delegate Death, supra note 14, at 90–91, 91 nn.174–75, 112–14, 112–14 nn.349–53.
352 Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death, supra note 14, at 86; see also Brief of
Sixteen Professors of Pharmacology as Amici Curiae in Support of Neither Party, Glossip v.
Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015) (No. 14-7955) (discussing the use of midazolam as an
anesthetic in executions).
353 SARAT, GRUESOME SPECTACLES, supra note 38, at 177 (Appendix A). Between 1980
and 2010, states botched 17.33% of electrocutions. Id.
354 Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death, supra note 14, at 111–12.
355 See SARAT, GRUESOME SPECTACLES, supra note 38, at 136; Ben Crair, Photos from
a Botched Lethal Injection, NEW REPUBLIC (May 29, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/
117898/lethal-injection-photos-angel-diazs-botched-execution-florida [https://perma.cc/
6BNA-S4TT]; Bernard E. Harcourt, The Barbarism of Alabama’s Botched Executions, N.Y.
REV. BOOKS (Mar. 13, 2018), https://www.nybooks.com/daily/2018/03/13/the-barbarismof-alabamas-botched-execution/ [https://perma.cc/YTA6-9LB8]; Lynn Waddell & Abby
Goodnough, Florida Executioner Says Procedures Were Followed, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20,
2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/20/us/20death.html [https://perma.cc/7KV6DAVE] (discussing testimony from Florida’s execution team in the botched execution of
Angel Diaz); see also Morales v. Tilton, 465 F. Supp. 2d 972, 979–80 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
356 See Jon Yorke, Comity, Finality, and Oklahoma’s Lethal Injection Protocol, 69
OKLA. L. REV. 545, 578–86 (2017); Teresa A. Zimmers & Leonidas G. Koniaris, PeerReviewed Studies Identifying Problems in the Design and Implementation of Lethal Injection
for Execution, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 919, 926–29 (2008).
357 See supra notes 91–106 and accompanying text.
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revisions to its execution protocols did not prevent errors in Charles Warner’s
execution or Richard Glossip’s scheduled execution.358 The Interim Grand Jury
Report presents a disturbing picture of inattention to detail. The Warner
execution team overlooked that they were using the wrong drug—potassium
acetate, instead of potassium chloride.359 None could explain how it happened
other than that they assumed someone else had approved it, or that they
“dropped the ball.”360
Baze’s prospective approval of lethal injection protocols only encourages
this majoritarian approach in death, delegation, and deference.361 Baze warned
against interfering with state legislatures’ roles in determining execution
procedures, particularly because states act “with an earnest desire to provide for
a progressively more humane manner of death.”362 The difficulty with this
assertion is that agencies do far more than legislatures—without oversight.
Baze’s approach conflates agencies and legislatures, giving one the deference
due to the other.363 Berger asserts that the “lack of legislative input casts serious
doubts on the [Baze] plurality’s insistence that rigorous judicial inquiry ‘would
substantially intrude on the role of state legislatures in implementing their
execution procedures.’”364 States may serve as laboratories of experimentation,
but the freedom to experiment cannot justify weakening important structural
protections built into state and federal constitutions.
Changes to execution protocols only highlight agencies’ inexpertise and the
breadth of agency discretion. Oklahoma’s brief experimentation with nitrogen
hypoxia as a method of execution that began in 2015 illustrates this problem.365
Oklahoma’s legislators relied on a fourteen-page report created over “three
hours one evening”366 by three professors who are not medical doctors.367
Oklahoma’s legislators also watched YouTube videos of teenagers inhaling
358 See Interim Multicounty Grand Jury Report, supra note 321, at 1–2.
359 Id.
360 Id. at 36–37. For further discussion of Oklahoma’s execution errors, see Robin C.

Konrad, Lethal Injection: A Horrendous Brutality, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1127, 1137–40
(2016).
361 SARAT, GRUESOME SPECTACLES, supra note 38, at 121.
362 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 51 (2008).
363 Berger, Individual Rights, supra note 267, at 2039–40.
364 Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference, supra note 14, at 60.
365 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1014(B) (West 2020); Lauren Gill, Using Nitrogen Gas
for Executions Is Untested and Poorly Understood. Three States Plan To Do It Anyway,
APPEAL (Oct. 25, 2019), https://theappeal.org/using-nitrogen-gas-for-executions-is-untested
-and-poorly-understood-three-states-plan-to-do-it-anyway/ [https://perma.cc/TY5V-KDKM].
366 Michael P. Copeland, Thom Parr, & Christine Pappas, Nitrogen Induced Hypoxia as
a Form of Capital Punishment (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Ohio State Law
Journal); Eli Hager, Why Oklahoma Plans to Execute People With Nitrogen, MARSHALL
PROJECT (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/03/15/why-oklahomaplans-to-execute-people-with-nitrogen [https://perma.cc/PM8G-GYPD].
367 Scott Christianson, How Oklahoma Came to Embrace the Gas Chamber, NEW
YORKER (June 24, 2015), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/how-oklahomacame-to-embrace-the-gas-chamber [https://perma.cc/3RVL-VCAD]; Hager, supra note 366.

972

OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 81:5

helium.368 The bill only authorized nitrogen hypoxia as a method of execution
in the event that lethal injection drugs were not available.369 There were no
details or guidance for the agency.370 The legislature did not designate who
would determine that lethal injection is “otherwise unavailable,” or criteria for
making the determination.371 In 2018, Oklahoma’s Attorney General
determined that, due to a severe shortage of execution drugs, Oklahoma would
switch to nitrogen hypoxia as its method of execution.372 After delays in
creating the protocol and obtaining necessary equipment,373 the Attorney
General announced in early 2020 that the state had “found a reliable supply of
drugs to resume executions by lethal injection[]” and the Department of
Corrections would “continue[] to work on a protocol that will allow the state to
proceed by execution through nitrogen hypoxia where appropriate.”374
Executive agencies and officials may not comply even when legislatures
provide more specific instructions.375 Montana’s execution protocol has been
struck down twice for violating the Montana Constitution’s separation of powers
provision because the protocol was inconsistent with the state’s method of
execution statute.376 Montana’s decision to identify the classes of execution
drugs made it possible for a court to evaluate the extent to which the agency
complied with the will of the legislature, even if the agency had discretion in
dosage calculation or other procedures that might need to be modified based on
the specific facts and conditions of particular executions.377 While this is a
separate administrative law inquiry, it is relevant to a court’s decision to defer
to agency expertise.
Inadequate criteria or fact-finding obligations incentivize agencies to take
shortcuts. Agencies’ tendency to copycat other jurisdictions’ protocols and
statutes concerning the death penalty, coupled with Baze’s prospective
368 Hager, supra note 366.
369 H.B. 1879, 55th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2015).
370 See id.
371 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 1014(B) (West 2020).
372 Hager, supra note 366.
373 See Nolan Clay, Executions by Gas Stalled Indefinitely While State Seeks Willing

Seller of Device, OKLAHOMAN (Jan. 27, 2019), https://oklahoman.com/article/5621219/
executions-by-gas-stalled-indefinitely-while-state-seeks-willing-seller-of-device [https://
perma.cc/ NSC3-XYQQ].
374 State Officials Announce Plans to Resume Execution by Lethal Injection, OKLA.
ATT’Y GEN. (Feb. 13, 2020) (on file with the Ohio State Law Journal).
375 See Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death, supra note 14, at 88, 102 n.261; see
also SARAT, GRUESOME SPECTACLES, supra note 38, at 90–91.
376 See Order on Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment at 22, Smith v. State, No. BDV2008-303 (Mont. 1st Jud. Dist. Sept. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Smith Order]; Montana Judge
Puts Executions on Hold, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Oct. 7, 2015), https://deathpenalty
info.org/news/montana-judge-puts-executions-on-hold [https://perma.cc/2BTP-MMFC].
377 See Smith Order, supra note 376, at 21. While this example relates to administrative
norms, it illustrates the importance of careful judicial scrutiny on separation of powers
questions.
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approvals, allows courts to rely on the similarity to other jurisdictions’
protocols, rather than the individual agency’s research, fact-finding, or
procedure. It also undermines claims that agencies have real expertise and
demonstrates that the protocols lack what Berger describes as a “democratic
pedigree”—the “political authority and epistemic authority underlying the
policy.”378 Such protocols deserve far less deference than courts accord them.379
Reliance on procedural controls is also misplaced. Agencies’ ability to alter
execution protocols depends on the extent to which agencies are bound by state
procedural rules. Agencies do not usually have to comply with state APA rules
to create execution protocols.380 Barkow has observed that, absent oversight or
internal controls on matters of charging and plea bargaining, “the potential for
arbitrary enforcement is high.”381 Scholars have contended that delegation in
criminal law contexts should be treated differently because such delegations are
“inconsistent with foundational criminal law doctrine, . . . present greater
threats to the principles underlying the nondelegation doctrine, and . . . are not
supported by the ordinary arguments in favor of delegation.”382 The same
arguments apply in execution protocols. Absent any restraints, there is a risk of
arbitrariness in selecting drugs or substances to cause death, and the
consequences can be horrifying.383 Unlimited agency discretion in the death
penalty context allows agencies to wield both legislative power and executive
power. Internal measures are necessary to protect individual rights when an
agency can use the powers of multiple branches.384 Courts addressing
nondelegation challenges are too willing to ignore the absence of internal
procedural checks as a constraint on agency discretion even when state
nondelegation doctrines expressly rely on such checks.385
Vague legislation and a lack of administrative procedure leave courts doing
precisely what the Baze plurality forecasted: “transform[ing] courts into boards
of inquiry charged with determining ‘best practices’ for executions, with each
378 Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference, supra note 14, at 39.
379 See Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 74–75 (2008) (Stevens, J. concurring); Berger,

Individual Rights, supra note 267, at 2058 (“Administrative law norms teach that agencies
deserve less respect when they are unaccountable, unknowable, and procedurally erratic.
Given that such agencies would not receive deference in the administrative law context, they
should not be afforded blanket deference in constitutional individual rights cases.”).
380 See supra notes 269–72 and accompanying text; see also Berger, Individual Rights,
supra note 267, at 2081–82 (discussing problems of deference and delegation when
legislatures “deliberately insulate[]” agencies from “political pressure” and “administrative
law more generally”).
381 Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 137, at 1026–27.
382 Hessick & Hessick, supra note 172, at 6.
383 See Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference, supra note 14, at 17–18, 60–61;
Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death, supra note 14, at 66, 66 n.21, 99.
384 See Brown, supra note 115, at 1555; Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 137,
at 1023–24. See generally G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL
(2000).
385 See supra notes 271–73 and accompanying text.
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ruling supplanted by another round of litigation touting a new and improved
methodology.”386 Despite criticisms that judicial enforcement of delegation
could overexpand the role of the judiciary,387 the judiciary has already taken on
an outsized role. A stricter approach arguably better serves separation of powers
principles by forcing the legislative branch to become more accountable. To be
sure, legislators are not rendered experts by virtue of elected office. Oklahoma’s
nitrogen hypoxia experiment aptly illustrates this point.388 But legislators
should impose more substantial guidelines, criteria, and procedural controls on
agencies than “sufficient to cause death.” And courts can—and should—comply
with their constitutional obligation to enforce separation of powers norms.

C. Why Death is Nondelegable
As long as states and the federal government intend to continue using the
death penalty, they must grapple with decision-making in executions. Who
makes decisions, and how they are made, are fundamental concepts underlying
our constitutional system.389 Rebecca Brown argues that separation of powers
principles under the nondelegation doctrine implicate individual liberties,
because “procedural requirements and separated powers are simply different
limitations on the exercise of government power, sharing a common goal: to
restrict arbitrary government action that is likely to harm the rights of
individuals.”390 Unconstrained agency delegation to create execution protocols
threatens prisoners’ rights by increasing the risk that capital punishment will be
inexpertly administered and cause severe pain and suffering. Weakening the
separation of powers poses a threat to core democratic systems.
Nondelegation may seem especially counterintuitive because discretion and
delegation are essential to continuing state-authorized killing.391 Indeed, courts
seem to favor delegation as a matter of legislative convenience, potentially for
countermajoritarian concerns.392 Berger has highlighted this issue as a false
application of countermajoritarian concerns about unelected judges making
386 Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35, 51 (2008); In re Ohio Execution Protocol, 860 F.3d 881,

886 (6th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
387 See Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 121, at 321.
388 See supra notes 367–75 and accompanying text.
389 See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
390 Brown, supra note 115, at 1555–56.
391 Cook v. State, 281 P.3d 1053, 1056 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012) (“It is both reasonable
and . . . acceptable for the Legislature to delegate the details . . . to an agency that is ‘better
equipped to undertake the task’ of ensuring that it is implemented as uniformly and humanely
as possible.”) (quoting Griffith Energy, LLC v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 108 P.3d 282, 287
(Ariz. Ct. App. 2005)); Ex parte Granviel, 561 S.W.2d 503, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) (en
banc) (“[T]he Legislature has . . . delegated to the said Director power to determine details
so as to carry out the legislative purpose which the Legislature cannot practically or
efficiently perform itself.”).
392 See Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155–56 (2002).
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decisions about “policy decisions made by government officials who answer to
the people.”393 When decisions are made by unelected and unsupervised
agencies, “judicial deference to them rests on shakier grounds.”394 Similarly,
the countermajoritarian difficulty is not as pronounced when judicial decisionmaking is aimed at preserving individual rights for disadvantaged groups.395
Death penalty exceptionalism fits within theories of nondelegation that
support heightened inquiry in criminal law contexts. The degree of discretion
that is acceptable should vary with the scope of the power that the legislature
accords an agency, as well as the executive agency or officer tasked with
carrying out the directives.396 The power to kill is an extraordinary one with
potential for incurable harm.397 Cass Sunstein has observed that “nondelegation
canons” constrain Congress from delegating certain tasks to agencies,
particularly when individual rights are implicated.398 A more robust
nondelegation inquiry is appropriate in evaluating method of execution statutes
because of the impact on individual rights and the potential for mischief in
undermining separation of powers in the state’s decision to kill.
In applying this analysis, courts should recognize that a method of execution
is a separate policy determination from the decision to use capital punishment
and should not import legislative enactments regarding the latter to conclude
that agencies have sufficient guidance to carry out the former. Blurring those
lines fails to hold legislators to their constitutional responsibility to define
crimes and fix punishments.399 Courts should also examine whether statutes
assign responsibility for fact-finding in nondelegation inquiries.400 Few method
of execution statutes contain requirements for agency fact-finding about speed,
pain, and drug effectiveness for lethal injection or other methods of

393 Berger, Individual Rights, supra note 267, at 2059–60.
394 Id. at 2060; see also Berger, In Search of a Theory of Deference, supra note 14, at 42

(“When courts strike down an agency policy adopted in secret with no legislative guidance
or oversight, the countermajoritarian concern sharply decreases.”).
395 See Aliza Cover, Cruel and Invisible Punishment: Redeeming the CounterMajoritarian Eighth Amendment, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1141, 1147–48 (2014).
396 See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Assn’s, 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001); see also Loving v.
United States, 517 U.S. 748, 772–73 (1996); Coglianese, supra note 120, at 1872–73.
397 Interim Multicounty Grand Jury Report, supra note 321, at 74 (depriving Charles
Frederick Warner of his right to contest the method of execution in accordance with
Oklahoma regulations); LAIN, LETHAL INJECTION, supra note 4 (manuscript at 43–44);
Konrad, Lethal Injection, supra note 360, at 1133–37; see also SARAT, GRUESOME
SPECTACLES, supra note 38, at 177–210 (identifying botched executions).
398 See Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 121, at 331–32.
399 See Ex Parte United States, 242 U.S. 27, 42 (1916); see also Weems v. United States,
217 U.S. 349, 378–79 (1910); Malloroy v. State, 435 P.2d 254, 255 (Idaho 1967).
400 See Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2141 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(criticizing the notion that fact-finding functions are sufficient to satisfy the “intelligible
principle” requirement, and emphasizing that Congress still must make the policy underlying
such fact-finding).
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execution.401 Requiring express directives from legislatures on this issue402 fits
within the contours of Justice Gorsuch’s heightened intelligible principle
inquiry in Gundy.403 It also requires legislators to “make the policy judgments”
about Eighth Amendment punishment by setting out terms of those inquiries.404
Aspects of execution protocols may require some agency flexibility,
including sourcing drugs and chemicals for executions, the need to identify
alternative substances, dosage calculation, or other on-the-spot decisions. But
the absence of facts for executives to consider and “criteria against which to
measure them”405 has proved problematic. A lack of legislative guidance
arguably contributed to agencies’ behavior in illegally importing drugs for
executions.406 Despite federal and state laws addressing who may obtain and
store controlled substances, agencies still obtain drugs without compliance,
explaining sourcing, or how they spend state dollars.407 States may prefer a nonspecific method of execution statute to permit flexibility in the face of drug
401 See Brief for the Fordham University School of Law, Louis Stein Center for Law and
Ethics as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 22–24, Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008)
(No. 07-5439) (summarizing the historically “unstudied way” lethal injection statutes have
been adopted, as derived from Oklahoma’s “purposefully vague” 1977 law); see also supra
notes 176–96 and accompanying text (discussing states’ method of execution statutes).
402 Denno has proposed that states conduct “in-depth study of the proper implementation
of lethal injection.” This study would assist in fact-finding issues for states in developing
procedures that presumably reduce pain or error, as well as identifying and responding to
botched executions. Denno, Lethal Injection Quandary, supra note 321, at 118–21.
403 See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141.
404 Id.
405 Id.
406 See KONRAD, BEHIND THE CURTAIN, supra note 24, at 24, 32; LAIN, LETHAL
INJECTION, supra note 4, at 14–22; Federal Authorities Seize Execution Drugs Imported for
Arizona and Texas, CBS NEWS (Oct. 23, 2015), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/federalauthorities-seize-execution-drugs-imported-for-arizona-and-texas/ [https://perma.cc/47R9PYWA]; Madlin Mekelburg, FDA Blocks Texas Import of Execution Drug, TEX. TRIB. (Apr.
19, 2016), https://www.texastribune.org/2016/04/19/fda-blocks-texas-import-executiondrug/ [https://perma.cc/ECL3-F5LB]. See also generally Cook v. FDA, 733 F.3d 1, 12 (D.C.
Cir. 2013). The DOJ recently issued an opinion concluding that the FDA lacks jurisdiction
in this arena. See Whether the Food and Drug Administration Has Jurisdiction over Articles
Intended for Use in Lawful Executions, 43 Op. O.L.C. 1, 1 (2019), https://www.justice.gov
/olc/opinion/file/1162686/download [https://perma.cc/DQN3-CE64].
407 See Interim Multicounty Grand Jury Report, supra note 321, at 18, 21 (“[T]he
Department never obtained [Oklahoma Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs] or DEA
registration allowing it to possess and/or store execution-related drugs . . . . OBNDD’s
Deputy General Counsel testified he has no idea how the Department properly obtained the
execution drugs . . . .”); LAIN, LETHAL Injection, supra note 4, at 41–45; Nebraska Supreme
Court Orders Release of Lethal-Injection Drug Records, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (May
20, 2020), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/news/nebraska-supreme-court-orders-release-oflethal-injection-drug-records?utm_source=WeeklyUpdate&utm_campaign=073ea20f52weekly_update_2017_w41_COPY_01&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_37cc7e4461073ea20f52-711075509 [https://perma.cc/G7PN-4NPN]; see also Denno, America’s
Experiment with Execution Methods, supra note 68, at 717.
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shortages. The need for flexibility alone, however, cannot justify unlimited
discretion without fact-finding obligations or a set of criteria and obligations for
agencies to consider before changing drugs or procedures. Legislatures are quite
capable of writing statutes that give agencies the ability to choose between
alternatives contingent on fact-finding or provide standards for agencies to use
when making decisions.
Take Tennessee. While its default method of execution is lethal injection, it
permits electrocution if “[t]he commissioner of correction certifies to the
governor that one (1) or more of the ingredients essential to carrying out a
sentence of death by lethal injection is unavailable through no fault of the
department.”408 This provision might not be a model of legislative clarity, but it
does set a condition (certification) and imply a requirement of fact-finding
(unavailability) before permitting the commissioner to switch methods. A court
reviewing such a decision would have some facts and criteria to evaluate.409
Arkansas also has offered some helpful specificity. The amended AMEA
requires ADC to use FDA-approved drugs obtained from either an FDAapproved facility or nationally accredited compounding pharmacy.410 Again,
this sets measurable criteria for courts, even if there are problems with drug
sourcing and pharmacies.411
Methods of execution statutes that require lethal injection be “swift and
humane”412 arguably offer a more identifiable policy to agencies tasked with
creating protocols. This standard, however, is not sufficient by itself because it
fails to address important concerns about agency expertise, personnel training,
and qualifications. Nor does it prevent agencies from shifting protocols without
fact-finding or measurable criteria. Giving agencies broad discretion to change
execution methods without factual findings or justification for those changes
creates a high risk of arbitrary action that may be difficult for courts to review,
especially when inmates’ challenges to execution protocols require swift
judicial decision-making.413
An absence of procedure presents a threat to judicial review and should
carry greater weight in nondelegation cases because it interferes with the
balance of powers.414 State nondelegation doctrines’ reliance on procedural
408 TENN. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. § 40-23-114(e)(2) (West 2020).
409 Cf. Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2141 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
410 ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-617(d) (West 2020).
411 See LAIN, LETHAL INJECTION, supra note 4, at 29–41 (discussing compounding

pharmacies).
412 KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4001(a) (West 2020). Kansas also requires certification that
the substances must comply with these criteria and any proposed changes require the same
certification. Id. § 22-4001(c).
413 See Cook v. State, 281 P.3d 1053, 1056–57 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2012).
414 See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2145 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (“Such an ‘evasive standard’
could threaten the separation of powers if it . . . allowed the agency to make the ‘important
policy choices’ that belong to Congress while frustrating ‘meaningful judicial review.’”
(quoting Indus. Union Dep’t, AFL-CIO v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 676, 685–6
(1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring))); Cook, 281 P.3d at 1058 (“If the Department were to
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protections in decision-making is sensible, because compliance with state
procedural requirements preserves accountability by requiring agencies to
engage with legislatively established processes in reaching decisions.415 When
agencies are free to alter their own protocols for any reason at all, including
notice obligations to inmates about execution methods, it threatens to interfere
with the judicial branch’s responsibilities.416 Courts’ reluctance to hold agencies
accountable for interference with judicial review abdicates the court’s essential
role in preserving the separation of powers as much as a legislative decision that
hands over core lawmaking power.417
The lack of transparency from agencies receiving these delegations should
also weigh against deferring to agency judgments.418 Although the legislature
has enacted these statutory provisions, indicating a policy preference for
secrecy, such secrecy is concerning, especially when there are few (or no)
procedural controls on agencies.419 Secrecy should be a component of
nondelegation inquiries because in the capital punishment context, secrecy
corrodes accountability and creates a risk that agencies will improperly wield
broad powers, especially because they lack constraints on their discretion.
Courts also err by treating constitutional prohibitions on cruel and unusual
punishment as limitations on agency discretion that preserve broad
delegations.420 First, these prohibitions address different interests. Rachel
continue [revising execution protocol] in such a way as to unreasonably limit . . . the courts
from exercising meaningful judicial review of its actions, then . . . we might be presented
with a separation of powers violation.”); see also Brown v. Vail, 237 P.3d 263, 269–70
(Wash. 2010) (en banc).
415 See supra Part II.A. (discussing states’ nondelegation doctrines).
416 See Cook, 281 P.3d at 1056–58; see also supra notes 277–84 and accompanying text.
417 See Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2145 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting) (explaining that leaving
executive agencies “free to make all the important policy decisions” makes it difficult for
courts to assess whether the agency had exceeded its authority); see also Gregg v. Georgia,
428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976) (“Where the sentencing authority is required to specify the factors
it relied upon in reaching its decision, the further safeguard of meaningful appellate review
is available to ensure that death sentences are not imposed capriciously or in a freakish
manner.”). But cf. Cook, 281 P.3d at 1058 (“This practice [late changes to execution
protocol] therefore threatens to ‘usurp the powers,’ of the Judiciary . . . . Nevertheless,
because Arizona courts have been able to provide review—albeit rushed—of the
Department’s changes to its protocol, . . . we hold that the Department has not yet violated
the Arizona Constitution’s separation of powers doctrine.”).
418 See Berger, Individual Rights, supra note 267, at 2066; see also supra notes 67–72
and accompanying text (discussing secrecy in executions).
419 Phillips v. DeWine, 841 F.3d 405, 421 (6th Cir. 2016) (Stranch, J., dissenting) (“HB
663 [protecting confidentiality for parties to executions] will obstruct scrutiny of Ohio’s
execution protocol. . . . [J]ust four years ago . . . we found it necessary ‘to monitor every
execution on an ad hoc basis’ because Ohio could not be ‘trusted to fulfill its . . . duty. . . . ”)
(quoting In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litig., 671 F.3d 601, 602 (6th Cir. 2012)); see also
supra note 269 and accompanying text.
420 See Cook, 281 P.3d at 1056 (reasoning that the Constitution “implicitly guides and
limits” agency decision making by forbidding any “serious pain and suffering,” which would
fall under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel and unusual punishment”).
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Barkow points out that the Bill of Rights “police[s] government abuse of power
to an extent, [but does] . . . not guard against the same structural abuses as the
separation of powers.”421 To be sure, there is a relationship between an Eighth
Amendment claim and a nondelegation claim in the death penalty because
arbitrary agency action, insufficient guidance, or expertise can trigger errors in
executions that may cause severe pain and suffering.422 Separation of powers
implicates process concerns and prevents the aggrandizement of power.423 The
Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual punishments
and accordingly does not check the potential for mischief inherent in allowing
an agency to wield executive and legislative powers.424
Second, constitutional principles cannot curb agency discretion. Cary
Coglianese has evaluated the importance of limits on discretion through the
intelligible principle analysis: “A statute will be constitutional as long as an
executive officer’s discretion is not unbounded in the same way that Congress’s
is.”425 As the Supreme Court pointed out in Whitman v. American Trucking
Associations, Inc., agencies cannot restrict overly broad delegations of
legislative power by picking their own limiting constructions of statutory
authority.426 Courts should not rely on agencies to limit themselves, particularly
because agencies cannot construe statutes unconstitutionally so they must
already comply with constitutional restrictions on pain and suffering in
executions.427 The intelligible principle requirement and parallel state law
doctrines dictate that the legislature must set the policy in the legislation it
enacts.428
In light of the stakes inherent in carrying out death sentences and the
horrifying consequences of broad agency discretion and responsibility-shifting
mechanisms in capital punishment, legislators should have a greater obligation
to define the punishment for a capital sentence. Courts should play their part by
protecting separation of powers and administrative law norms to inject greater
accountability in a system that, thus far, demands very little.

421 Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 137, at 1032.
422 See, e.g., State v. Deputy, 644 A.2d 411, 420 (Del. Super. Ct. 1994), aff’d, 648 A.2d

423 (Del. 1994); see also Hessick & Hessick, supra note 172, at 25–26 (discussing the
relationship between individual liberties and separation of powers).
423 Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 137, at 1032–33.
424 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 137, at
1032–33.
425 Coglianese, supra note 120, at 1861.
426 Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001).
427 See Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, supra note 121, at 331.
428 Whitman, 531 U.S. at 472 (“[W]e repeatedly have said that when Congress confers
decision-making authority upon agencies Congress must ‘lay down by legislative act an
intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed to conform.”)
(quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (emphasis and
alterations in original)); see also supra Part II.A.
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VI. CONCLUSION
An argument that principles of nondelegation are viable in evaluating the
death penalty may sound like grasping at straws to oppose the death penalty.
Why bother asking legislatures to be more specific in considering how prisoners
should be executed? Do arguments about how these decisions are made, who
makes the decisions, policy, and procedure really just paper over other glaring
defects in the death penalty?429 Some may contend that these challenges are
attempts to evade a lawfully-imposed sentence by complaining about technical
and procedural trivialities.
The separation of powers and compliance with procedure are integral
constitutional principles that matter a great deal in a democratic society and are
core values in the American system of government.430 As Justice Frankfurter
explained, “The history of liberty has largely been the history of observance of
procedural safeguards.”431 The history of the imposition of the death penalty
appears to be one of largely unconstrained delegation by virtually every entity
or individual involved in capital punishment.
In making decisions about death, it is tempting to try to find someone else
to carry the burden or to be accountable. In Caldwell v. Mississippi,432 the
Supreme Court held that “it is constitutionally impermissible to rest a death
sentence on a determination made by a sentencer who has been led to believe
that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness of the defendant’s
death rests elsewhere.”433 Nor should it be constitutionally permissible to allow
legislatures to shirk their constitutional obligation to set punishments, especially
in capital sentencing. The choice to enact the death penalty is a separate policy
choice than how the state chooses to kill. Legislatures should not be able to shift
the responsibility for determining how the state kills in the name of the people
429 See generally BESSLER, KISS OF DEATH, supra note 77; GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE,
supra note 3; David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination and the
Legitimacy of Capital Punishment: Reflections on the Interaction of Fact and Perception,
53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1411 (2004); William J. Bowers, Thomas W. Brewer, & Charles S.
Lanier, The Capital Jury Experiment of the Supreme Court, in THE FUTURE OF AMERICA’S
DEATH PENALTY: AN AGENDA FOR THE NEXT GENERATION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
RESEARCH 199 (Charles S. Lanier et al. eds., 2009); Corinna Barrett Lain, The Politics of
Botched Executions, 49 U. RICH. L. REV. 825 (2015); J. Michael Martinez, “Freakishly
Imposed” or “Fundamentally Fair”? Legal Arguments Against the Death Penalty, in THE
LEVIATHAN’S CHOICE: CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 227 (J.
Michael Martinez, William D. Richardson & D. Brandon Hornsby eds., 2002).
430 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 381 (1989) (“[T]he greatest security against
tyranny—the accumulation of excessive authority in a single Branch—lies not in a hermetic
division among the Branches, but in a carefully crafted system of checked and balanced
power within each Branch.”); Cass, supra note 120, at 152–53; Madison, supra note 113, at
250–51.
431 McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 347 (1943).
432 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
433 Id. at 328–29.
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to agencies, particularly because they systematically remove procedural
constraints associated with accountability and transparency. Passing difficult
policy decisions to agencies that lack oversight or transparency undermines core
democratic values.
Responsibility for death cannot, and should not, be delegated away. Respect
for “one of the most vital of the procedural protections of individual liberty
found in our Constitution” demands more.434

434 Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2145 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).

